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SUMMARY 
Distinct perception for voluntary vs. externally-generated action outcomes has been 
demonstrated in timing and intensity domains. First, time interval between an action and its 
outcome is perceived shorter. Second, sensory stimuli triggered by one’s own action is 
judged as less intense than similar stimuli triggered externally. The differential perception 
of voluntary action outcomes has been attributed to efference copy-related predictive 
mechanisms, and has been studied extensively using behavioral and imaging methods. 
However, although voluntary movements in the real world produce feedback in multiple 
modalities, previous experiments mostly investigated unimodal action outcomes. Therefore, 
the perception of multisensory inputs associated with our own actions remains to be 
explored. The aim of this dissertation was to fill this gap by investigating the behavioral and 
neural correlates of multisensory action outcomes. In Study 1, synchrony perception for 
multisensory outcomes triggered by voluntary vs. externally-generated movements was 
assessed. Study 1.1 showed increased perception of simultaneity for audiovisual stimulus 
pairs around the time of action. Study 1.2 revealed a similar effect also when the movement 
was externally-generated, underlining the importance of causal relations between events in 
shaping time perception. Interestingly, the slopes of the psychometric functions in the 
voluntary condition were significantly steeper than the slopes in the externally-generated 
condition, suggesting a role of action-related predictive mechanisms in making synchrony 
perception more precise. Study 2 investigated the neural correlates of perceiving unimodal 
vs. bimodal inputs triggered by voluntary button presses compared with passive viewing of 
identical stimuli. Results showed BOLD suppression for voluntary action outcomes in 
comparison to passive viewing of the same stimuli. This BOLD suppression effect was 
independent of the to-be-attended modality and the number of modalities presented. The 
cerebellum was found to be recruited more during bimodal trials and when a delay was 
detected. These findings support action-related predictive processing of voluntary action 
outcomes, demonstrating it also for multisensory action outcomes. The findings also 
indicate the cerebellum’s role in error-related action outcome processing, and the influence 
of the additional sensory modality on error-related activity in the cerebellum. Study 3 
investigated neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. bimodal action outcomes by 
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focusing on efference copy-related predictive processing in a naturalistic experimental set- 
up. Results extend findings of Study 2 regarding the predictive processing of multisensory 
action outcomes to a naturalistic context, and support the role of the cerebellum in error- 
related action outcome processing. Importantly, activity in the cerebellum was modulated 
by the additional modality, highlighting the role of multisensory processing in shaping motor- 
sensory interactions. Together, findings of these studies strengthen existing evidence on 
the distinctive perception for voluntary action outcomes, extending it to multisensory action 
outcomes, and to a realistic context. Implications of this line of research extend to revealing 
mechanisms behind agency deficits frequently observed in schizophrenia, as well as to the 
development of intervention techniques targeting the rehabilitation of patients with spinal 
cord injury or stroke. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Studien haben gezeigt, dass es Unterschiede in der Wahrnehmung von 
Handlungskonsequenzen gibt, abhängig davon ob die Handlung eine eigene, willkürliche 
Bewegung ist oder extern generiert wurde. Zum Beispiel wird die Zeit zwischen eigenen 
Handlungen und deren Konsequenzen kürzer wahrgenommen, als sie eigentlich ist. Des 
Weiteren werden sensorische Stimuli, die aus eigenen Handlungen entstehen, als weniger 
intensiv wahrgenommen als extern erzeugte Stimuli. Als Grund für die unterschiedliche 
Wahrnehmung von eigenen und extern generierten Handlungskonsequenzen vermutet 
man den Efferenzkopiemechanismus. Dieser wurde bereits vielfach mittels behavioralen 
und bildgebenden Methoden untersucht. Wenn auch willkürliche Bewegungen in der ‘realen 
Umwelt’ Rückmeldungen an das Gehirn über verschiedene Modalitäten nach sich ziehen, 
haben bisherige Untersuchungen lediglich unimodale Handlungskonsequenzen untersucht. 
Daher ist die Wahrnehmung von multisensorischen Inputs der eigenen 
Handlungskonsequenzen, ein noch unerforschtes Thema. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist 
es, diese Lücke zwischen behavioralen und neuronalen Korrelaten multisensorischer 
Handlungskonsequenzen zu schließen. In der ersten Studie wurde die synchrone 
Wahrnehmung von multisensorischen Konsequenzen untersucht, welche durch willkürliche 
oder extern erzeugte Handlungen ausgelöst wurden. Studie 1.1 zeigte eine gesteigerte 
Wahrnehmung von Simultanität der audiovisuellen Stimulipaare über die Zeit der Handlung 
auf. Studie 1.2 konnte einen ähnlichen Effekt bei extern generierten Bewegungen zeigen. 
Dies unterstreicht die Rolle der zeitlichen Abfolge der Ereignisse für die Zuweisung von 
Kausalität. Der unterschiedliche Effekt der willkürlichen Handlungen manifestiert sich in der 
Genauigkeit der Bewertung ihrer Simultanität. Interessanterweise waren die Steigungen der 
psychometrischen Funktionen bei den Bedingungen mit willkürlicher Bewegung signifikant 
steiler als in der Bedingung mit extern-generierter Bewegung. Dies lässt eine Rolle von 
Efferenzkopiemechanismen bei der Wahrnehmung von Simultanität vermuten. Die zweite 
Studie untersuchte die neuronalen Korrelate der Wahrnehmung von unimodalen und 
bimodalen Handlungskonsequenzen bei willkürlichem Tastendrücken im Vergleich zur 
passiven Beobachtung der identischen Handlungskonsequenzen, ohne diese verursacht 
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zu haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine BOLD-Unterdrückung bei willkürlichen Handlungen 
verglichen mit der Bedingung des passiven Beobachtens der Stimuli, unabhängig von 
Modalität der Stimuli, auf welche die Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet war. Das Cerebellum scheint 
eine zentrale Rolle in bimodalen Bedingungen zu spielen, v.a. in der Detektion von 
Verzögerungen zwischen den Stimuli der Modalitäten. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen eine 
distinkte neuronale Wahrnehmung willkürlicher Handlungen, bei der Verarbeitung von 
Multisensorischen Reizen. Die dritte Studie untersuchte die neuronalen Korrelate der 
Wahrnehmung von uni- vs. bimodalen Handlungskonsequenzen mit Fokus auf 
Efferenzkopiemechanismen in einer naturalistischen experimentellen Umgebung. Die 
Ergebnisse stützen die zuvor aufgeführten Befunde im Bezug auf 
Efferenzkopiemechanismen bei der Wahrnehmung von selbstgenerierten 
Handlungskonsequenzen, und erweitern diese Befunde für einen multisensorischen 
Kontext. Weiterhin unterstreichen sie die Beteiligung des Cerebellums an 
Efferenzkopiemechanismen. Wesentlich ist hier, dass der modulatorische Effekt der 
zweiten Modalität auf das BOLD-Signal die Rolle von multisensorischen Prozessen bei 
motorsensorischen Interaktionen unterstreicht. Zusammen genommen bestärken die 
Studien die unterschiedliche Wahrnehmung von Handlungskonsequenzen willkürlicher 
Bewegungen und extern generierter Bewegungen und erweitern diese Befunde mit einem 
multimodalen Setting. Arbeiten aus diesem Gebiet können maßgeblich dazu beitragen, 
gestörte Zuweisungen von Urheberschaft bei Schizophrenie besser zu verstehen. Des 
Weiteren kann ein besseres Verständnis dieser Prozesse dazu beitragen, Patienten mit 
Rückenmarksverletzungen oder Schlaganfall effizienter behandeln zu können. 
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ACC: anterior cingulate cortex 
AV: audiovisual 
BOLD: blood-oxygen-level dependent 
 
fMRI: functional magnetic resonance imaging 
IPL: inferior parietal lobule 
MTG: middle temporal gyrus 
PMD: passive movement device 
SMA: supplementary motor area 
SJ: simultaneity judgment 
SOA: stimulus onset asynchrony 
STG: superior temporal gyrus 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation aims to fill the gap in our existing knowledge on action perception 
by bringing multisensory nature of action outcomes to focus. This is important, since most 
goal-directed actions lead to multiple sensory inputs, which need to be integrated not only 
to each other but also to the action that triggers them. The Introduction is organized to 
provide an overview of the literature on action outcome processing and multisensory 
perception in an attempt to reconcile these two research areas. In this respect, it mainly 
explains why voluntary action outcome processing is considered unique, how it manifests 
itself on a behavioral and neural level, and how multisensory processing is relevant to 
understand voluntary action outcome processing. At the end, questions remained to be 
investigated are mentioned, some of which were addressed in this dissertation. 
 
 
1.1 The interplay between perception and action 
 
1.1.2 Perception and action as reciprocal experience 
 
"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do." 
 
Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Noë , 2004, p.1) 
 
 
 
The above quote from Alva Noë highlights the notion that perception is not a one- 
way process in which events taking place in the environment are passively encoded. 
Perception is, on the contrary, a product of our interactions with the world surrounding us, 
realized through active inquiry and exploration. In this sense, a reciprocal relationship 
between our actions and perception exists in making sense of ourselves and the external 
world (Wagman, 2008). 
There are fundamentally two ways in which humans interact with their environment. 
This can be either through manipulating the world to produce desired states, or by 
accommodating one’s goals to environmental demands (Herwig et al., 2007; Prinz, 1997). 
While the former is termed as voluntary, intention-based or operant in which the agent aims 
7 
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to produce a desired goal, the latter is termed as reaction, stimulus or response-based 
which allows for adapting to changes in the environment (Herwig et al., 2007; Prinz, 1997). 
To put it simply, the difference lies in whether an action is voluntary or externally-generated. 
Voluntary actions are characterized by their goal-directedness in that they aim towards 
producing internally pre-specified effects (Herwig et al., 2007). Although the attribute of 
‘intentionality’ regarding voluntary movements not as straightforward as it seems (Haggard 
and Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983b), it is useful to differentiate actions triggered by more 
readily observed external inputs from those that seem to be more under one’s control. 
Moreover, voluntary and externally-generated actions are rarely dichotomous in everyday 
experience, with both movements representing two different ends of a continuum (Krieghoff 
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, a classification based on the dichotomy would allow one to 
investigate the fundamental differences between these actions. 
Since most of our everyday actions involve a voluntary component, substantial 
amount of research has explored in detail the interplay between voluntary movements and 
their sensory outcomes. In general, existing evidence indicates a unique manner in which 
voluntary actions and their outcomes are processed. 
 
 
1.1.3 Perceiving sensory outcomes of voluntary actions: what is unique about it? 
 
Research on voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes has consistently shown 
that self-generated inputs are perceived differently than those inputs triggered externally 
(Blakemore et al., 1999, 1998; Haggard et al., 2002). These perceptual effects are mainly 
observed in two domains: perceived timing for action outcomes and perceived intensity of 
the sensory effect. 
First domain concerns the subjective experience of time regarding the voluntary 
action and its effect. Perceived timing between a voluntary action and its sensory outcome 
has been found to be distorted. A seminal study by Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, (2002) 
demonstrated that perceived timing of voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes are 
attracted towards each other. This effect is termed as intentional binding, and has been 
established in other experiments (Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard and Cole, 2007). It has also 
been demonstrated that temporal discrimination regarding the voluntary movement and its 
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outcome is impaired immediately after the action, not later during the action outcome phase 
(Wenke and Haggard, 2009). In addition, temporal predictability, namely the predictability 
of the interval between the action and the outcome, and contiguity of the action outcome 
contribute to the intentional binding effect (Cravo et al., 2011; Haggard et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, intentional binding seems to be specific to voluntary actions, as individual 
factors found to influence binding are not sufficient for the effect to occur (Cravo et al., 2011; 
Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Wohlschläger et al., 2003). 
Second domain regarding the differential processing of voluntary action outcomes 
concerns perceived intensity of sensory inputs triggered by voluntary actions. Accordingly, 
sensory outcomes generated by one’s own movements are perceived as less intense 
compared with equivalent sensory inputs that are externally-generated (Blakemore et al., 
1998; Sperry, 1950; Von Holst, 1950; Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Wolpert et al., 1995). This 
phenomena is known to as sensory suppression (or sensory attenuation), and has been 
found to manifest itself both on a behavioral (Bays et al., 2005; Blakemore et al., 1998; 
Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010) and neural level (Baess et al., 2008; Blakemore et al., 1998; 
Hughes et al., 2013; Hughes and Waszak, 2011; Shergill et al., 2013). In addition, support 
for the existence of sensory suppression comes from several studies using different 
methodologies. In their comprehensive review on sensory suppression, Hughes, Desantis, 
& Waszak (2012) list studies using subjective report (Blakemore et al., 1999), signal 
detection methodology (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010), and subjective equality judgments 
(Sato, 2008), among others (Bays et al., 2005; Voss et al., 2007). Moreover, sensory 
suppression has been shown to occur for somatosensory (Bays et al., 2005; Blakemore et 
al., 1998; Voss et al., 2008), auditory (Aliu et al., 2009; Baess et al., 2011, 2008; Horváth et 
al., 2012; Knolle et al., 2012; Schafer and Marcus, 1973; Timm et al., 2014) and visual 
(Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010) modalities. 
In order to illustrate mechanisms underlying intentional binding and sensory 
suppression, two influential theoretical perspectives have been proposed, namely the 
ideomotor theory and forward models. 
9 
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1.2 Mechanisms underlying action outcome perception 
 
1.2.1 Ideomotor theory 
 
Although the history of ideomotor theory goes back to the mid-1800s, it has begun 
to be considered as a legitimate scientific framework during the 1970s, as behaviorism 
restricted its study (for reviews, see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010; Stock & Stock, 2004). 
Greenwald (1970) and Prinz (1987) were the modern pioneers of the ideomotor framework 
and its experimental investigation. Ideomotor theory of action control attempts to explain 
the origin of voluntary actions with regard to their perceivable effects. It posits that goal- 
directed actions are selected, initiated and executed with respect to their sensory outcomes 
(Prinz, 1997; Walter and Rieger, 2012). To put it differently, voluntary actions are 
characterized by their anticipated effects, which stems from a bidirectional association 
between sensory representations and motor commands of the action (Elsner and Hommel, 
2001; Greenwald, 1970; Herwig et al., 2007; Prinz, 1997; Waszak et al., 2012). In this 
sense, the idea of an action’s sensory effect is equivalent to the actual movement, hence 
the term ‘ideomotor’ (James, 1950). It is therefore claimed that action selection depends on 
the sensory outcome that is predicted to trigger, via learned action-effect associations 
(Waszak et al., 2012). Several studies have provided corroborative evidence for the 
ideomotor principle (Elsner et al., 2002; Elsner and Hommel, 2004, 2001; Herwig et al., 
2007; Kunde, 2001). These studies mainly demonstrated that when a certain association is 
formed between an action and a sensory event, anticipating the action effect impacts 
behavior. 
Although contemporary ideomotor approaches maintain the assumption of a direct 
association between an action and its anticipated effect acquired through learning, the 
nature of these associations necessitates more evidence. Furthermore, despite substantial 
evidence supporting the ideomotor view, these theories have been claimed to downplay 
one important aspect: the movement itself (Chambon and Haggard, 2013). This aspect is 
incorporated in forward models of motor control which attempt to clarify mechanisms behind 
voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes. 
10 
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1.2.2 Forward models of motor control 
 
Recent computational motor control theories attempt to elucidate the relation 
between voluntary movements and their sensory outcomes in terms of internal and forward 
models. Accordingly, goal-directed actions result in peripheral and central signals. 
Distinguishing these signals is of high relevance to the organism because it allows for 
recognizing the outcomes of self-generated actions as separate from those outcomes 
generated externally, providing more efficient processing of external inputs that might likely 
harm the individual as opposed to inputs arising as a result of one’s own action (Blakemore 
et al., 1998; Desmurget and Grafton, 2000; Wolpert et al., 2001; Wolpert et al., 1995). 
Moreover, such a system enables a highly accurate representation of movements and their 
sensory outcomes, promoting the learning of action outcome associations and ensuring that 
the desired goal state is attained (Frith et al., 2000). 
Goals can be achieved by a central monitoring mechanism which consists of internal 
models that represent aspects of one’s own body and the external world (Frith et al., 2000; 
Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert et al., 1995). Forward (predictors) and inverse (controllers) models 
correspond to different models the organism utilizes to achieve the desired state. Whereas 
an internal forward model is used to acquire the causal relation between events by 
predicting the next state of the system, inverse models are used to determine motor 
commands required to attain a certain sensory outcome. Forward models accomplish this 
by using an efference copy of the motor command in order to anticipate and modulate the 
processing of sensory outcomes resulting from the action. The motor command needed for 
the desired state change is produced by the inverse model (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Sperry, 
1950; Von Holst, 1950; Wolpert et al., 1998). Such a mechanism can be used to 1) 
compensate for delays that likely occur within sensorimotor loops due to differences in 
neural transduction or processing delays, 2) anticipate and cancel expected sensory 
outcomes of a movement caused by oneself (sensory re-afference), 3) transform sensory 
errors between expected and actual sensory feedback into motor command errors, 
promoting sensorimotor learning, and 4) optimally estimating the current state of the system 
(Davidson and Wolpert, 2005; Doya, 1999; Frith et al., 2000; Wolpert et al., 1998, 1995; 
Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). As stated above, forward models explain sensory 
suppression as the result of a match between the actual and the desired state of the system 
(Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert et al., 1998). In case of a discrepancy, the system needs 
11 
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to either update predictions regarding the action outcome relation, or attribute the source to 
an external event (Blakemore et al., 1999). 
An important role attributed to the forward model concerns the sense of agency, 
namely the subjective experience of being in control of one’s own actions and the outside 
world one aims to manipulate (Chambon and Haggard, 2013; Moore, 2016). In addition to 
allowing external unexpected events to have prioritized processing, sensory suppression 
has been linked with the formation of sense of agency (Chambon and Haggard, 2013; Frith 
et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2012). For example, Tsakiris et al. (2005) demonstrated that 
efferent information contributes to self-recognition, and neither visual nor proprioceptive 
feedback arising from one’s action is sufficient for generating the effect. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that the efferent motor command is a necessary component for agency to 
occur (Engbert et al., 2007; Haggard and Cole, 2007). Intentional binding has been 
proposed as an implicit measure of agency over sensory events, suggesting that binding 
results from motor prediction mechanisms (Haggard et al., 2002; Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2003). 
 
 
1.2.3 Summary of ideomotor theories and forward models 
 
Ideomotor theories and forward models share the common assumption that 
predictive relations between voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes underlie how 
these outcomes are processed and influence our perceptual experience as active agents. 
Both frameworks put high emphasis on the anticipatory nature of action outcome 
associations by positing that action effects can be predicted before they are experienced, 
through sensorimotor learning (Franklin and Wolpert, 2011; Shin et al., 2010; Wolpert and 
Flanagan, 2001). Intentional binding and sensory suppression are hypothesized to result 
from such a prediction mechanism (Hughes et al., 2012). However, the assumptions of 
these frameworks are still to be investigated. Neuroimaging offers a complementary means 
to reveal the link between voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes. 
12 
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1.3 Neural correlates of perceiving voluntary actions and their outcomes 
Voluntary actions comprise a series of processing stages which lead to the 
generation of conscious action experiences (Haggard et al., 2002). These stages include 
the intention and decision to move, generation and execution of motor commands, re- 
afferent feedback arising from the motor command and the use of this feedback for action 
monitoring (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983b; Yarrow and Obhi, 2014). Neural 
correlates pertaining to these stages have been investigated using a variety of 
methodologies. 
 
 
1.3.1 Planning and execution of voluntary actions 
 
It has been demonstrated that the medial wall of the human cortex plays an 
important role in motor learning and control. More specifically, this region has been found 
to be involved substantially in planning, execution and selection of voluntary movements 
(Picard and Strick, 1996). Single cell recordings provided further evidence for the 
involvement of this area in motor preparation (Fried et al., 2011). Using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), several studies sought to better isolate areas specifically 
implicated in voluntary actions by contrasting these movements with externally-generated, 
involuntary, observed and/or imagined movements. Findings have revealed common as 
well as distinct mechanisms regarding the processing of these movements. 
Voluntary and externally-generated movements both engage medial motor areas 
such as the supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA and rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), 
contralateral primary motor and sensory cortices, insula, contralateral cerebellum, and 
parietal cortices (Ciccarelli et al., 2005; Cunnington et al., 2002; Szameitat et al., 2012; 
Weiller et al., 1996). Despite these commonalities studies also find relative or distinct 
involvement of these regions along with other brain structures in the generation of voluntary 
movements. Among them, frontostriatal circuit seems to be specifically involved in the 
planning, initiation and execution of voluntary movements. The frontostriatal circuit consists 
of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), cingulate motor areas/anterior cingulate (ACC) 
and SMA (Cunnington et al., 2005, 2002; Deiber et al., 1999; Herwig et al., 2007; Jenkins 
et al., 2000a; Lau et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2007; Weiller et al., 1996; Wiese et al., 2004). 
The premotor cortex on the other hand, seems to be involved in the general planning, 
13 
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programming, initiation, and guidance of simple and skilled motor tasks (Grèzes and 
Decety, 2001). More detailed evidence comes from event-related or time-resolved imaging 
studies, which provide invaluable information on particular areas recruited during each 
processing stage of the voluntary movement. Early movement-related potentials (MRPs), 
namely the cortical activity associated with a voluntary movement, have been found to 
precede the movement by several hundred milliseconds. Early components of MRPs are 
thought to reflect movement preparation whereas late components have been linked to 
movement execution (Cunnington et al., 1996). SMA is the area implicated in generating 
these potentials (early MRP), suggesting its role in motor preparation (Cunnington et al., 
1996). Other studies provide further evidence for the specific involvement of the rostral 
region of the SMA (pre-SMA) in early phases of movement preparation (Cunnington et al., 
2002; Lee et al., 1999; Weilke et al., 2001; Wildgruber et al., 1997). In addition, pre-SMA 
seems to be implicated in action representation prior to movement execution (Cunnington 
et al., 2005; Picard and Strick, 1996). Aside from SMA, evidence exists for the role of 
cingulate motor areas in movement preparation. For example, part of the ACC (RCZ) has 
been found to be relevant for freely choosing an action, which is considered as one of the 
defining aspects of voluntary movements (Lau et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2007). 
Although above-mentioned investigations contributed extensively to our 
understanding of how we act purposefully, several limitations exist in disentangling the 
neural basis of voluntary movements. For example, baseline conditions that have been 
used as contrasts to voluntary movements are confounded by motor and perceptual 
differences. In an attempt to address these limitations, Mueller et al. (2007) adopted a 
paradigm from Waszak et al. (2005) which enabled them to compare internally and 
externally-generated actions while controlling for perceptual and motor confounds present 
in previous investigations. They found that whereas RCZ is specifically engaged during 
intentional movements, pre-SMA activity is present in both movements. Their results 
suggest the importance of dissociating ‘what’ and ‘when’ components inherent in the 
intention to move while controlling for common processes shared by different movements. 
(Krieghoff et al., 2009) provided supporting evidence for the findings of Mueller et al. (2007) 
by pointing to the interdependence between which action to perform and when to perform 
it. Together, these studies highlight the necessity to consider dissociable functions of the 
14 
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human cortex in performing voluntary actions, as well as interactions between these 
functions. 
In addition to medial frontal areas, parietal areas have been implicated in the 
planning and execution of voluntary movements (Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009; Farrer et al., 
2008; Fourneret et al., 2002; Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Lau et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2004; 
Libet et al., 1983b; Sirigu et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 2004). This is supported by the finding 
that parietal cortex has functional connections with the premotor cortex (Andersen and 
Buneo, 2002; Assal et al., 2007; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009; Farrer et al., 2008; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007; Haggard, 2009; Sirigu et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 2004). In a detailed study, 
Desmurget & Sirigu (2009) showed that the posterior parietal cortex stimulation is 
associated with the conscious intention to move even when the motor response is absent. 
This finding clearly underlies the importance of parietal cortex on the conscious intention to 
move. 
In sum, action planning and execution engage several areas of the brain, some of 
which seem highly distinct for voluntary actions while other areas are recruited by a variety 
of movements. Despite mixed findings, several studies suggest distinctive processing for 
voluntary movements in pre-motor and parietal areas in action planning and execution. 
 
 
1.3.2 Neural correlates of action outcome processing 
 
In addition to distinct neural processing involved in the planning and execution of 
voluntary movements, sensory outcomes resulting from these actions are also processed 
differently in the brain. Recently, Kühn et al. (2011) showed that anticipating a certain 
movement activates not only motor-related areas, but also those areas responsible for 
coding of the movement’s expected sensory consequences. This and a number of other 
investigations stress the necessity of conceptualizing voluntary actions together with their 
learned sensory effects (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008). 
A number of studies focusing on the interplay between actions and their sensory 
outcomes examined the neural basis of sensory suppression and error-related processing 
of action outcomes. Earlier investigations by Blakemore et al. (1998; 1999) demonstrated 
that tactile sensations arising from self-generated movements vary as a function of the 
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discrepancy between expected and predicted sensory effects. More specifically, they found 
that ratings of ticklishness of a tactile stimulus increase when temporal or spatial 
discrepancy exists between the actual and predicted outcome of the voluntary movement 
(Blakemore et al., 1998). This is reflected in the neural responses associated with 
perceiving the tactile feedback of the movement, by activation reductions in somatosensory 
areas when there is no discrepancy between the actual and the expected sensory feedback, 
suggesting suppression at a neural level (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore et al., 1999). 
An important question regarding the processing of action outcome associations 
concerns the contribution of efference copy signals. The region of interest which provides 
efferent signals to sensory cortices has been much of debate: some studies found support 
for the SMA as the area providing efferent signals (Haggard and Whitford, 2004), or the 
ventral premotor cortex (Christensen et al., 2007a), while others state cerebellum to be 
highly relevant for the generation of efferent signals (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore et 
al., 1998; Knolle et al., 2013, 2012). Indeed, cerebellum has been proposed to act as a 
forward controller, transforming the predicted sensory goals into motor representations. 
Accordingly, the cerebellum generates efference copy signals under the current state of the 
system, producing not only an estimated motor output, but also of expected sensory 
outcomes generated by these outputs (Wolpert et al., 1998). In line with this assumption, 
this area has been shown to play a role in modulating sensory outcomes of motor 
commands, providing an error signal used to cancel the somatosensory responses to 
voluntary movements (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Miall et al., 
1993). Apart from somatosensory action outcomes, Knolle et al. (2013, 2012) demonstrated 
that cerebellum generates predictions for auditory action outcomes. These findings support 
the assumption that sensory suppression results from predictive processing of action 
outcomes (Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 1998; 
Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003). 
In addition to the SMA and the cerebellum, parietal cortex has been implicated in 
action outcome processing. Convincing evidence exists on the distinct involvement of this 
area in processing self-generated inputs (Christensen et al., 2014; MacDonald and Paus, 
2003; Sirigu et al., 1999). This is supported by the finding that activity in the parietal cortex 
is linked to the processing of temporal and spatial errors between voluntary movements and 
their sensory outcomes (Leube et al., 2003a). There is also evidence for the relevance of 
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this area in movement control (Rizzolatti et al., 1997). Furthermore, parietal cortex has been 
found to be involved in the integration of multisensory inputs (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002) 
as well as visuo-motor information (Christensen et al., 2007b). Angular gyrus, a region 
located in the parietal cortex, has been proposed as a candidate area for processing action 
outcome discrepancies (Farrer et al., 2008; Sirigu et al., 2004). This area has been 
implicated in the selection of intentional actions (Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), with 
enhanced activity associated with decreased attribution of agency over events (Kühn et al., 
2011). A recent study by Zwosta et al. (2015) also suggests a general involvement of this 
area in action outcome processing, not only in cases of discrepancy. Melcher et al. (2008) 
provided additional evidence for the involvement of angular gyrus in action outcome 
processing, along with the cerebellum. Therefore, studies suggest that areas of the parietal 
cortex and the cerebellum are highly implicated in representing the current and the 
predicted state of the system, resulting in sensorimotor integration and error-related action 
outcome processing (Frith et al., 2000). 
 
 
1.4 State of the art and beyond: multisensory action outcomes and naturalistic action 
outcome relations 
Recently there has been a growing interest in exploring how action and perception 
are interrelated in naturalistic settings (Ingram and Wolpert, 2011; Kingstone et al., 2008; 
Körding and Wolpert, 2004). This involves not only the utilization of virtual reality or tracking 
systems outside the laboratory to create more realistic action perception scenarios, but also 
the inclusion of aspects intrinsic to the action perception cycle in the real world. 
First, more and more studies use computer-generated sensory feedback, virtual 
reality and tracking systems that allow measurement beyond the laboratory to examine the 
interplay between action and perception (Ingram and Wolpert, 2011; Kingstone et al., 2008). 
This is strikingly different than previous studies in which an action is highly restricted in its 
execution as well as its effects. Even though we live in a highly computerized environment, 
we still need to be able to acknowledge actions we perform in our everyday lives which are 
highly characterized by complex movement sequences. In addition, sensory feedback 
generated by our actions are also not as simplistic as in most experimental settings. 
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Therefore, incorporation of these features to research paradigms is a crucial step in 
understanding everyday actions and accompanying perceptual experience. 
Another issue regarding ecological validity concerns the nature of our daily actions. 
Although research on action outcome processing usually involves an action triggering 
sensory input from a certain modality, our actions often lead to multiple sensory outcomes. 
Combining sensory information from different modalities is crucial in order to have a 
meaningful representation of the world (Driver and Spence, 2000). As regards multisensory 
processing, current approaches also manifest a growing interest in exploring naturalistic 
situations (Chandrasekaran et al., 2009; Senkowski et al., 2007). Various animal and 
human studies have established that sensory processing is not modular, and sensory 
modalities interact with each other in early phases of sensory information processing (for a 
review see Shimojo and Shams, 2001). Neural underpinnings of multisensory processing 
provide additional insights into how information arriving from different senses interact. 
Previously, it has been assumed that a hierarchical processing scheme exists in which 
sensory-specific brain areas are devoted to the processing of sensory stimulus of a 
particular modality at an early stage, while higher order multisensory convergence zones 
(areas of the brain receiving afferent inputs from different senses) are involved in processing 
multisensory information in later stages (Macaluso, 2006). More recent investigations 
suggest that the so-called sensory-specific areas are also responsive to stimuli from other 
modalities, and multisensory processing indeed begins at early stages of information 
processing (Driver and Noesselt, 2008; Macaluso, 2006; Shimojo and Shams, 2001). These 
investigations have also provided convincing evidence for enhanced behavioral 
performance (i.e., heightened perceptual awareness, decreased reaction times) coupled by 
increases in cortical activity related to sensory processing (Foxe et al., 2000; Giard and 
Peronnet, 1999; McDonald et al., 2000; Stein et al., 1996; Vroomen and de Gelder, 2000). 
Converging sensory inputs providing information about a single event seems to underlie 
this enhancement (Driver and Spence, 2000). In addition, there is evidence that such 
enhancement can also be observed even when a stimulus provides no information about 
the other sensory modality (Giard and Peronnet, 1999; McDonald et al., 2000; Stein et al., 
1996; Vroomen and Gelder, 2004). On the other hand, just as a particular sensory modality 
can enhance the processing of another modality, it can also hinder its processing (Colavita, 
1974; Kawashima et al., 1995; Meredith, 2002; Morein-Zamir et al., 2003; Sinnett et al., 
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2008; Wang et al., 2012). For example, Laurienti et al. (2002) found significant reductions 
in cortical activity linked to visual processing during the presentation of an auditory input 
and vice versa, possibly as a way of increasing the salience of a relevant sensory modality 
that seems more important in the processing hierarchy. In both cases, spatiotemporal 
correspondences as well as semantic congruencies between different sensory inputs seem 
to drive these effects (Murray et al., 2004; Senkowski et al., 2007). 
The above-mentioned studies underlie the significance of investigating multisensory 
interactions, not only among different senses, but also in relation to our interactions with the 
external world. In the context of voluntary movements, very few studies addressed 
multisensory processing of action outcomes. Among these was an EEG study by Mifsud et 
al. (2016), which found that while auditory stimuli lead to suppressed ERPs as indicated by 
a decrease in the auditory N1 component, visual stimuli result in an opposite effect (increase 
in the early visual N145 component). This finding clearly suggests cross-modal differences 
regarding sensory modalities in relation to voluntary movements. Other studies focusing on 
multisensory interactions in the context of action outcome processing have provided 
evidence regarding distinct time perception between voluntary actions and their 
multisensory outcomes (Desantis and Haggard, 2016a, 2016b; Parsons et al., 2013; van 
Kemenade et al., 2016). Recently our group has investigated behavioral and neural indices 
of perceiving multisensory as opposed to unisensory movement outcomes, and found 
behavioral advantage (van Kemenade et al., 2016) as well as neural processing differences 
for multisensory action outcomes (van Kemenade et al., 2017). These findings provide 
further evidence for the importance of exploring multisensory action outcomes. 
 
 
1.5 Summary of the literature and open questions 
Ideomotor and forward model frameworks attempt to explain mechanisms behind 
action outcome perception by highlighting predictive processing of acquired action outcome 
associations, which is responsible for distinctive perceptual experience. In this sense, these 
theories emphasize predictive processing acquired by learned associations between 
actions and accompanying sensory inputs. Despite the fact that neuroimaging studies in 
recent years have contributed vastly to our understanding on the interplay between action 
and perception, several issues remain to be further investigated. These involve the role of 
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multisensory influences on action outcome processing and naturalistic action outcome 
associations as a means to better understand real world situations. 
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2 AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to address the multisensory aspect of voluntary 
action outcomes which is an integral part of our everyday experience, but which has so far 
been overlooked. In this respect, the aim of the present dissertation was to investigate 
behavioral and neural correlates of multisensory action outcome perception. Behaviorally, 
time perception for multisensory stimuli triggered by voluntary actions were assessed. 
Regarding neural correlates, brain regions associated with perceiving unimodal and 
bimodal sensory outcomes triggered by voluntary actions were assessed. Another aim was 
to explore these associations in a more naturalistic setting using more realistic action 
outcome relations. 
Study 1 investigated synchrony perception for multisensory action outcomes as 
opposed to similar outcomes triggered externally. It was assumed that temporal 
asynchronies between multisensory outcomes are tolerated when these outcomes occur 
close to the action that trigger them, in other words, when actions and outcomes are 
temporally contiguous. In the case of externally-generated movements, absence of 
efference copy-related predictions would lead to decreased asynchrony tolerance, even 
when the stimuli are temporally contiguous with the action. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses were tested in Study 1: 
1. Perception of synchrony regarding multisensory stimuli is maintained despite 
temporal asynchronies, when the stimuli are triggered by a voluntary action. 
2. Decrease in temporal contiguity between the voluntary action and the multisensory 
stimuli lead to decrease in synchrony judgments. 
3. Perception of synchrony for multisensory stimuli is higher when the stimuli are 
triggered by a voluntary compared with an externally-generated movement. 
4. Decreased temporal contiguity between the action and the multisensory stimuli 
results in decreased synchrony judgments for voluntary compared with externally- 
generated movements. 
Study 2 and 3 focused on the neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. bimodal 
action outcomes. In Study 2, voluntary button presses leading to unimodal auditory or 
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visual, and bimodal audiovisual (AV) inputs were presented. Systematic delays were 
induced between the button press and the sensory outcome in order to investigate how 
temporal discrepancies between actions and their outcomes would modulate 
accompanying neural responses. Participants were also asked to detect these delays, 
which would enable them to focus on the action outcome discrepancy, and allow for 
behavioral assessment of delay detection when the outcome was unimodal vs. bimodal. 
Voluntary trials were compared with a control condition in which same sensory inputs were 
presented after a cue, without the execution of an action. It was expected that sensory 
processing during voluntary actions would be suppressed. The detection of temporal 
discrepancies between the action and the outcome would also result in increased activity 
in areas associated with the updating of action outcome predictions (i.e. cerebellum), and 
more so with the additional modality which would presumably provide extra information on 
the temporal discrepancies. The specific hypotheses tested in Study 2 were as follows: 
1. Neural responses to voluntary movement outcomes are suppressed compared with 
neural responses to passive viewing of identical sensory inputs. 
2. Neural responses to voluntary movement outcomes are similar when the movement 
leads to unimodal vs. bimodal outcomes due to predictive processing of action 
outcomes. 
3. Neural responses associated with subjective delay detection involve brain regions 
linked with processing error-related information regarding the predicted relation 
between the action and the outcome such as the cerebellum, as opposed to 
subjectively undelayed trials. 
4. Neural responses associated with subjective delay detection are influenced by 
whether the action outcome is unimodal or bimodal. 
Study 3 delved more into the question of action specific predictive processing of 
sensory outcomes by adopting externally-generated movements of the wrist as a 
comparison to voluntary hand movements. Accordingly, voluntary movements of the right 
hand leading to visual (via real time display from a camera) or AV feedback were compared 
with externally-generated movements of the hand. Such a set-up would also allow for a 
more naturalistic investigation of action outcome relations. Temporal delays were presented 
between the movement and the sensory outcome, and the participants were asked to detect 
delays between the actual movement and the visual feedback of the movement. As in Study 
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2, BOLD suppression would be expected when the movements were voluntary, with 
recruitment of areas specific to updating of predictions regarding voluntary action outcome 
associations, and increased error-related processing in bimodal trials compared with 
unimodal trials. The specific hypotheses that were tested in Study 3 were as follows: 
1. BOLD suppression in sensory cortices occurs during voluntary movements 
compared with externally-generated movements. 
2. Neural responses to unimodal and bimodal inputs associated with voluntary 
movements are similar independent of the modality received due to predictive 
processing of voluntary action outcomes. 
3. Subjectively delay detection leads to increased error-related processing in areas 
such as the cerebellum as opposed to subjectively undelayed trials. 
4. Neural activity correlated with subjective delay detection is impacted by movement 
and modality of the sensory outcome, i.e. increased error-related processing occurs 
for voluntary compared with externally-generated movements. 
 
 
2.1 Overview of the Experimental Design 
All studies in the present dissertation involved a voluntary movement leading to 
unimodal and/or bimodal sensory outcome/s. In all studies, different timing judgments were 
assessed. Because voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes are usually closer in time 
and/or can be predicted in time, manipulations in timing were hypothesized to lead to 
discrepancies between the action and the sensory outcome, influencing perceptual 
experience. In all experiments, a baseline condition was included to address action-related 
predictive processing of sensory outcomes. In Study 2, this was passive viewing of identical 
sensory stimuli triggered by the voluntary action, whereas in studies 1 and 3, it consisted of 
externally-generated movements in order to disentangle efference copy-related predictive 
processes specific to voluntary movements, from re-afferent sensory feedback present in 
both movements (for a review see Hughes et al., 2012). In Study 1, synchrony perception 
for multisensory action outcomes were examined by using simultaneity judgments, by 
coupling sensory inputs to voluntary and externally-generated movements. In Study 2, 
neural correlates of perceiving multisensory action outcomes were examined using 
voluntary button presses which triggered unimodal and bimodal visual and auditory 
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outcomes as well as passive viewing of identical stimuli. Brain areas implicated in the 
processing of action outcome discrepancies were assessed by presenting systematic 
delays between the action and the outcome. In Study 3, neural correlates involved in 
perceiving multisensory action outcomes were explored by examining brain areas 
associated with the perception and error-related processing of voluntary vs. externally- 
generated movement outcomes using naturalistic action outcome relations. 
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3 STUDY 1: SYNCHRONY PERCEPTION FOR 
MULTISENSORY ACTION OUTCOMES 
 
The content of Study 1 has been published as: 
 
Arikan, B.E., van Kemenade, B.M., Harris, L.R., Straube, B., Kircher, T. (2017). Voluntary 
and involuntary movements widen the window of subjective simultaneity. Iperception 8(4), 
doi:10.1177/2041669517719297. 
 
 
3.1 Background 
Determining whether a clicking sound belongs to a light switch or a keyboard is one 
of the challenges the brain faces in response to the sensory events around it. Integrating 
sensory signals is necessary to form a coherent percept, and eventually a meaningful 
experience of the external world. 
Although extensively studied on the perceptual level, research on multisensory 
interactions mainly focused on sensory stimuli that are external in nature (Alais et al., 2010). 
However, it has been well-documented that our actions shape how we perceive sensory 
stimuli compared with when they are spontaneously triggered. One phenomenon regarding 
this differential processing concerns the perceptual passage of time. In a seminal study by 
Haggard et al. (2002), it has been shown that there is a subjective compression of time 
between a voluntary movement and its consequence compared with when a movement is 
not intentional. More specifically, ‘the perceived time of the action is shifted forwards 
towards the effect, and the time of the effect is also shifted backwards in time towards the 
action that caused it.’ (Haggard and Cole, 2007, p. 212). This effect, known as intentional 
binding, has been replicated in later studies (Moore and Obhi, 2012; Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2003). The tendency to bind voluntary actions to their effects was explained as a process 
that maintains a sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002), or perceptual constancy (Yarrow 
et al., 2001). There is also evidence that intentional binding helps us build causal relations 
between actions and their consequences (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009a). Moreover, a 
recent study by Kawabe et al. (2013) emphasizes the importance of perceptual grouping 
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between actions and their perception of causally related effects, suggesting that the 
resulting sense of agency can likely be explained by causality and cross-modal grouping. 
Voluntary actions contain a certain sequence of processes to form a coherent 
stream of conscious action experiences (Haggard et al., 2002). These processes reflect the 
intention and decision to move, the generation and subsequent execution of the motor 
command, reafferent sensory feedback, and the use of this feedback for action monitoring 
(Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983a; Yarrow and Obhi, 2014). Interestingly, the 
perceived timing of actions appears to be different from the actual timing as measured by 
the cortical activity occurring well before movement onset (the readiness potential; Haggard 
et al., 1999; Libet et al., 1983a; Obhi et al., 2009; Yarrow and Obhi, 2014). If this information 
is present long before the movement, it could be used to generate predictions that are 
complete even before the movement occurs. Compatible with this idea, cells have been 
reported in the parietal cortex that adjust their response properties in anticipation of the post 
movement stimulation (Duhamel et al., 1992). The intentional binding effect is not present 
for involuntary movements or when the consequence of the action follows after an 
unpredictable delay (Haggard et al., 2002). These findings suggest that our motor system 
is used to make specific predictions of the effects they produce, influencing timing 
perception for these effects (Haggard, 2005). The perception of timing for actions and their 
effects have mostly been investigated using one sensory modality as the feedback of the 
action. However, voluntary movements usually have multiple sensory consequences. 
Tapping a tabletop, for example, creates visual, auditory, tactile, and proprioceptive 
feedback, which need to be integrated. In general, the nervous system maintains the 
perception of synchrony between the senses despite variations in the arrival times of 
sensory inputs to the brain (Fain, 2003). This mechanism is important presumably to 
determine whether the events are from single or multiple sources (Levitin et al., 2000). 
Therefore, for example, there is a tendency to perceive two sensory events as simultaneous 
if they are thought to originate from a common source (Stevenson et al., 2012; van 
Wassenhove et al., 2007; Zampini et al., 2003). 
Very few studies have focused on timing perception in which a voluntary action has 
multiple sensory consequences. In one study, Parsons et al. (2013) assessed recalibration 
for the perceived timing of AV stimulus pairs preceded by voluntary button presses. They 
found that the predictable auditory stimulus was perceived as shifted in time, whereas the 
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perceived timing of the unpredictable visual stimulus remained constant. The authors 
explain this finding with regard to the prior assumption that sensory consequences of 
actions should occur without a delay (Stetson et al., 2006) and that the perceptual system 
interprets events occurring at short delays after an action as the sensory consequences of 
that action (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002). In a recent study, Desantis and Haggard 
(2016b) investigated the influence of action planning and prediction on AV temporal 
grouping. In the study, participants first learned associations between different 
simultaneous AV pairs to voluntary button presses or to visual cues. Therefore, both 
auditory and visual stimuli were predictable by either a movement or a sensory cue. Results 
showed increased tolerance to asynchronies for AV pairs when they followed previously 
associated actions. Moreover, they demonstrated that the perception of simultaneity for AV 
pairs depends on learned timing relations between the action and the outcome of that 
action. Another related study by Corveleyn et al. (2015) investigated mechanisms playing 
a role in sensory binding for action versus perception. Using a perceptual and a motor task, 
they assessed how judgments of relative timing regarding changes in the color and position 
of a visual target would differ when they were followed by a voluntary movement. Results 
indicate reduced temporal asynchrony between color and position changes in the target 
when they were temporally and spatially close to the movement. The researchers conclude 
that voluntary actions seem to facilitate binding of sensory events that they trigger, by 
influencing timing constraints inherent in the neural processing of sensory inputs, leading 
to a reduction in perceived asynchrony between events. 
In both Desantis and Haggard (2016b) and Parsons et al. (2013), the focus was on 
the perceptual grouping of multisensory stimuli when they were triggered by a voluntary 
movement compared with when they occurred without movement. Similarly, in the 
Corveleyn et al. (2015) study, the interest was on the perception of changes in intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties of a target when it was followed by a movement compared with when it 
was only perceived. In other words, these studies focus more on the influence of voluntary 
movements on the perception of simultaneity for sensory events, as opposed to when these 
events occur externally. Therefore, the control conditions in these experiments consisted of 
passive viewing of the sensory stimuli, which made it possible to assess mere perceptual 
grouping effects. However, to investigate the effect of action-related predictive processes 
on the perceptual grouping of sensory inputs, the specific influence of the voluntary 
27 
STUDY 1 
 
 
 
 
movement itself should be considered as well. Voluntary movements lead to both efferent 
and re-afferent feedback. On the other hand, sensory feedback that is externally triggered 
provides only re-afferent information (Weiskrantz et al., 1971). 
In Study 1, the aim was to investigate how perception of simultaneity was maintained 
for the multisensory consequences of a voluntary movement. Specifically, the involvement 
of temporal contiguity and action-related predictive processing on the perception of 
simultaneity for multisensory stimuli were assessed. For this purpose, temporal relationship 
between the action and the multisensory feedback was varied to investigate how changes 
in temporal contiguity would influence perceived timing of these feedback. In a second 
experiment, the influence of action-related predictive processing on the perception of 
simultaneity for sensory inputs was addressed. In both experiments, participants were 
asked to initiate button presses at a time of their choice. The button press triggered the 
occurrence of a dot and a tone with a range of stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). The 
participants decided whether the dot and the tone were simultaneous or not. The stimulus 
pairs were presented either immediately following the button press or with one of two 
delays. Research on simultaneity perception suggests that there is a tolerance for how far 
two stimuli can be separated in time and still be perceived as simultaneous. This time 
window, known as the window of subjective simultaneity (WSS), has been found to be 
influenced by the assumption that both signals originate from a single source (the 'unity 
assumption'; Vatakis and Spence, 2007). In line with this, increased tolerance for 
asynchronies in AV stimuli was expected when they were contiguous with the action. To 
address the specific influence of voluntary movement, an externally controlled button was 
used in Study 1.2, which allowed for manipulating the influence of action-related predictive 
processing on AV simultaneity judgments (SJs). Increased tolerance to asynchronies was 
expected in the voluntary condition compared with the involuntary condition, as the 
participants would not be in control of the occurrence of AV stimulus pair. Support for this 
comes from studies showing less or no temporal binding to actions to their outcomes when 
the actions are not voluntary (Haggard et al., 2002; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2003). This study 
is the first to assess the influence of action-related predictive processing defined as the 
absence of intention on simultaneity perception for AV stimuli (representing multisensory 
consequences of an action). 
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3.2 Study 1.1 
 
3.2.1 Methods 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four right-handed students (mean age 24.1±2.6, 16 females) from Philipps 
University Marburg took part in the experiment. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants included in the study. They reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
normal hearing. Right-handedness was confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee and performed 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants were paid for their 
participation. 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus 
Visual stimuli were presented on a 24’’ computer screen (1920 x 1200 pixels 
resolution, 60Hz frame refresh rate). Auditory stimuli were presented via headphones. 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by Octave and Psychtoolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997). A 
chin rest was used to stabilize the subject’s head during the experiment. Button presses 
were made via a button pad using the participant’s right hand. The button pad was covered 
with a black box to prevent participants from using visual cues. Responses were made on 
a keyboard (‘V’ for ‘Yes’, ‘N’ for ‘No’) using the left hand. 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Stimuli and procedure 
The visual stimulus was a black dot (1.5° visual angle, 0cd/m2 luminance) at the 
center of the display against a neutral gray background (~89 cd/m2 luminance). The auditory 
stimulus was a pure auditory tone burst with a frequency of 250Hz. To attenuate potential 
auditory cues arising from the button press, white noise was presented throughout the 
whole experiment. There were two within-subject factors: SOA and delay. Eleven SOAs 
between the auditory and visual stimuli were used: ±417.5, ±334, ±250.5, ±167, ±83.5, and 
0ms. Negative SOAs indicate that the auditory stimulus was presented first, whereas 
positive SOAs indicate that the visual stimulus was presented first. The duration of the first 
stimulus (dot or tone) was 1000ms, and stimulus pairs always terminated at the same time. 
29 
STUDY 1 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the actual duration of the lagging stimulus was smaller than 1000ms, depending 
on the SOA. Because we were interested in how movement influences the perception of 
synchrony, we instructed participants to use event onset times, rather than the offsets. 
Three delays were presented between the button press and the occurrence of the first 
stimulus: 0ms, 417.5ms, and 2500ms. A previous study by Haggard et al. (2002) suggested 
that binding of actions to their effects was stronger when the timing between the action and 
the consequence was around 250ms in comparison to 450 or 650ms, that is, when the 
stimulus was time contiguous with the action. Another study showed a decreasing tendency 
to perceive a stimulus as not representing the consequences of a voluntary action after a 
long delay (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; but see Humphreys and Buehner, 2010). We 
therefore used an intermediate delay of 417.5ms and a very long delay of 2500ms. The 
long delay was expected to serve as a condition in which the action and the effect was torn 
far apart in time, presumably leading to an impression that the effect did not originate from 
the action. Each SOA was repeated 10 times for each delay, for 330 trials. The trials were 
divided into two experimental runs. The combination of SOAs and delays were presented 
in random order with the restriction that both runs had the same number of delays and 
SOAs. 
The experiment was conducted in a dimly lit room. Participants sat in front of the 
computer screen at a viewing distance of 54cm. They were instructed to place their right 
hand on a button pad, with their index finger on the button. Participants were instructed to 
perform button presses at a self-chosen time after a cue. The button press triggered the 
occurrence of the stimulus pair. The task was to judge whether the dot and the tone were 
simultaneous or not. Participants were also told that in some trials, there would be a delay 
between their button press and the occurrence of the stimulus. However, they were told that 
the task in these trials would remain the same: judging the simultaneity of the dot and the 
tone. To familiarize participants with the stimuli and the task, participants completed a block 
of 45 trials with smallest and largest SOAs and delay conditions (5 trials for each 
combination) with feedback before the start of the experiment. The practice trials were 
followed by the two experimental runs with a short break in between the runs. The whole 
procedure took 1.5 hours. 
Each experimental trial started with a variable intertrial interval (ITI; 1000, 1500, 
2000ms) during which a fixation cross (0.5 x 0.5cm) was presented. After the ITI, a black 
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square (310 x 310pixels, 3.2° visual angle) surrounding the fixation cross was presented in 
the middle of the screen. This square served as a cue for participants to initiate their button 
press. The participants were instructed to wait for approximately 700ms after the 
appearance of the square, but they could choose to wait longer if they wanted. This was 
done to elicit a well-prepared, self-initiated button press rather than an automatic reflex to 
the cue (Rohde and Ernst, 2013). If the button was pressed too early, a ‘too early’ warning 
was presented, and the trial was repeated. After the button press, the multisensory stimulus 
was displayed following one of the three delays. The square remained on the screen during 
the presentation of the stimulus pair. After the offset of the stimulus pair and the square, a 
500ms interval followed. Subsequently, the question ‘Simultaneous? Yes/No’ was 
presented on the screen. Participants used their middle and index fingers of their left hand 
for responding ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ respectively. They were given a maximum of 4000ms to respond 
after which the next trial followed. If they took longer than that, next trial followed. The 
sequence is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of an experimental trial in Study 1. After a variable ITI, a square cued participants to press a 
button at a time of their choice. Immediately or after a certain delay, a dot and a tone with variable SOAs (ranging 
from audition-leading 417.5ms to vision-leading 417.5ms) followed. The participants then judged whether the 
dot and the tone were simultaneous or not. ITI=intertrial interval; SOAs=stimulus onset asynchronies. 
 
 
 
3.2.1.4 Data analysis 
MATLAB 2012b (The Mathworks Inc., 2012) and psignifit toolbox version 2.5.6 for 
MATLAB (Fründ et al., 2011) were used for plotting SJs and fitting the data. SJs were plotted 
as a function of SOAs for each participant and delay. The data then were fitted with a two- 
criterion window model of the SJ task (Cravo et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2014; Ulrich, 1987; 
Yarrow et al., 2013, 2011). This model generates a psychometric function that is 
constructed from the differences of two cumulative probability functions (each having a 
normal distribution) and has the following four parameters: two means (window limits) 
representing the positions of the decision criteria on the SOA axis for simultaneity, and two 
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standard deviations (slopes) representing the sums of two sources of variability. The 
advantage of such a model is that it can account for asymmetries in perceiving simultaneity 
(Rohde et al., 2014; Yarrow et al., 2011). The values that fall between the decision criteria 
are considered simultaneous, defining the WSS. In the current experiment, the two sides of 
the psychometric function corresponded to the audition-leading and vision-leading sides, 
with positive values denoting that the dot came first. 
Statistical analyses on the window limits and slopes was carried out using SPSS 21 
(IBM Corp. Released 2012). Huynh–Feldt-corrected degrees of freedom were used in cases 
where sphericity was violated as indicated by the Mauchly’s test of sphericity (Huynh and 
Feldt, 1976). 
 
 
3.2.1.5 Deviance analysis 
To test whether the participants were guessing or found the task difficult, the four- 
parameter model was tested against a simpler two-parameter model. This simpler model 
can capture participants who were guessing in which case their data would not vary 
systematically with SOA, or who were not given a sufficiently broad range of SOAs so that 
both transitions from synchrony to asynchrony would not be captured. The deviance for 
each model fit was estimated for each participant in each condition, and then the deviance 
difference (2 x difference in log likelihood) between the models was calculated. The 
difference in deviance from a simpler to a more complex model follows a chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of free parameters between the 
models (Yarrow, submitted). Participants were retained when this difference was 
significantly greater than the critical values for the chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom (Yarrow et al., 2013; Yarrow, submitted). None of the participants was excluded 
on this basis. 
 
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
Statistical analyses were performed on the estimated window limits and slopes. For 
the statistical analyses on window limits, values on the audition-leading side of the curve 
were first sign-inverted to compare their distances from true simultaneity. A 2(Stimulus 
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order: audition-leading vs. vision-leading) x 3(Temporal delays: 0 vs. 417.5 vs. 2500ms) 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the estimated window 
limits. There was a main effect of stimulus order, F(1, 23) = 39.31, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.35. The 
window limits for audition-leading side (M across all delays = 178, SD = 16) were lower than 
the window limits for vision-leading side (M across all delays = 315, SD = 25; see Figure 
2a). We also found a main effect of delay, F(1.32,30.28) = 13.38, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.11. 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t tests showed significant differences between the 0ms (M = 
301, SD = 27) and 417.5ms (M = 227, SD = 22) delays, t(23) = 5.87, p < .001, d = 3.04, and 
between 0 and 2500ms (M = 211, SD = 12) delays, t(23) = 3.70, p = .001, d = 4.36 (see 
Figure 2b). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results from Study 1.1. a) Proportion of ‘simultaneous’ responses as a function of SOAs for each 
delay, fitted to a two-criterion window model. Negative SOAs depict trials where the tone came first. Curves are 
normalized to the peak. The data depictions are provided for illustrative purposes only. Statistical analyses were 
based on individual data fits. b) Estimated WSS across all delays, derived from individual fits. c) Estimated 
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slopes across all delays, derived from individual fits. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
SOAs=stimulus onset asynchronies; WSS=window of subjective simultaneity. 
 
 
 
A similar repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on the slopes showed a significant 
effect of stimulus order, F(1, 23) = 7.51, p < .05, ƞ2 = 0.08. Slopes for the audition-leading 
side (M = 102, SD = 13) were significantly steeper than the slopes for the vision-leading 
side (M = 148, SD = 19; Figure 2c). The slopes of the curves did not significantly differ 
across delays. 
 
 
3.2.3 Preliminary Discussion 
 
Participants were highly tolerant of asynchrony between a multisensory stimulus 
pair when it immediately followed the action. When the temporal interval between the action 
and the AV pair was increased, there was a greater sensitivity to asynchrony for these 
stimuli. However, this effect did not increase for the longest delay condition, suggesting that 
the effect might have saturated. When vision preceded audition, sensitivity to asynchronies 
was lower (as indicated by higher window limits and shallower psychometric functions) than 
when audition preceded vision. In other words, decision boundaries to judge the AV pair as 
simultaneous were higher on the vision-leading side than that of the audition-leading side. 
Such an asymmetry has been documented previously for AV SJs, in which the PSS was 
shifted toward a vision-leading stimulus and indicated that the perceived simultaneity is 
maximal if visual stimulus appears slightly before the auditory stimulus (Dixon and Spitz, 
1980; Spence and Squire, 2003; Vatakis and Spence, 2006; Zampini et al., 2003). 
Is the widened WSS related specifically to a voluntary movement or just to the 
occurrence of a stimulus pair immediately following a button press? To test this, we included 
an externally-generated movement condition in which the same task was performed, but 
with an automatically depressed button. With this condition, we aimed to assess the role of 
action-related predictions in judging simultaneity while maintaining comparable 
proprioceptive feedback for both conditions. 
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3.3 Study 1.2 
 
3.3.1 Method 
 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants from Philipps University Marburg took part in the 
experiment (mean age = 24±3.13, 15 females). They were a different group from the 
participants in Study 1.1. Informed consent was obtained from all participants included in 
the study. They reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Right 
handedness was confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). The 
experiment was approved by the local ethics committee and performed in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants were paid for taking part in the experiment. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Apparatus 
The setup was the same as in the first experiment, except that a custom-made 
button was used. This allowed for actively pulling the button down with an electromagnet 
(Intertec, ITS-LS2924B-D, 12V DC). Stroke length of the button was 5mm with a micro 
switch triggered within the last 0.2mm of movement. Both voluntary manual and externally 
activated button presses were recorded by the computer as a left click of a USB mouse. 
Therefore, jitter and delay of the button press did not depend on whether the condition was 
voluntary or externally-generated. For the voluntary movement, the initial force was 
1.5Newton (N), as measured by a spring force gauge, slowly increasing to approximately 
2.5N in the final position. In the externally-generated movement condition, the finger was 
initially pulled with approximately 1N, and the force increased to approximately 4N in the 
final position. The duration of the depression of the button press in the externally-generated 
condition was set to 300ms that was representative of the duration of the button press based 
on a previous piloting. The AV stimulus pair was presented only when the button was 
depressed completely, both for voluntary and externally-generated conditions. Participants 
wore soft foam earplugs to attenuate the sound of the ‘external’ button press. Moreover, 
white noise was presented to attenuate any sound, especially the one caused by the 
externally activated button. The participant’s right index finger was fixed to the button by a 
cotton bandage that was flexible enough not to cause discomfort. This was done to ensure 
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that the finger would go along with the button in the externally-generated condition. The 
cotton bandage was present in both voluntary and externally-generated conditions. 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli were identical to Study 1.1 with the following differences: The 2500ms 
delay condition in Study 1.1 was not found to be different than the intermediate delay 
condition. For that reason, we excluded the longest delay condition was excluded and an 
intermediate delay between 0 and 417.5ms delays was included. The following delays were 
used: 0, 167.7, and 417.5ms. The procedure was identical to Study 1.1, except for the 
following: In the voluntary condition, participants made button presses at a self-paced time, 
with the same timing (>= 700ms) criterion as in Study 1.1 following the start of the cue. In 
the externally-generated condition, the button was pulled down automatically by the 
computer after the appearance of the cue. The timing of the automatic button press was 
jittered across trials (700–1500ms). This was done to prevent participants from predicting 
the timing of the button press from the cue. The participants were presented with both 
voluntary and externally-generated conditions divided into 2 runs on 2 consecutive days. 
The order of voluntary and externally-generated conditions were counterbalanced across 
participants. The entire procedure took 1.5 hours. 
 
 
3.3.1.4 Data analysis 
The analysis was the same as in the previous experiment. One participant 
completed only the first half of the study, so the data from this participant was excluded. 
The data from the remaining 23 participants were analyzed (mean age = 23.57±3.34, 14 
females). The data were plotted and fitted to the two-criterion model. Deviance analyses 
showed that three participants had one condition that did not conform to the chi-square 
distribution. All data from these participants were excluded from the final analyses. 
 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
A 2(Movement type: voluntary vs. involuntary) x 2(Stimulus order: audition-leading 
vs. vision-leading) x 3(Temporal delays: 0 vs. 167.7 vs. 417.5ms) repeated-measures 
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ANOVA was conducted on the estimated window limits. There was no main effect of 
movement type, F(1, 19) = 3.50, p = .08. There was a main effect of stimulus order, F(1, 
19) = 17.35, p < .01, ƞ2 = 0.23. Thus, previous results on asymmetrical window limits for 
simultaneity when vision led audition (M = 257, SD = 26) in comparison to when audition 
led vision (M = 159, SD = 15; Figure 3a and b) were replicated. There was also a main 
effect of delay, F(1.88, 35.68) = 34.75, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.14. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t 
tests showed that there was significant differences across all the delay conditions: between 
0ms (M = 257, SD = 16) and 167.7ms (M = 205, SD = 21), t(19) = 5.88, p < .001, d = 3; 
between 167.7 and 417.5ms (M = 163, SD = 21), t(19) = 3.56, p = .002, d = 2.05; and 
between 0 and 417.5ms, t(19) = 7.25, p < .001, d = 5.31 (Figure 3c). A significant interaction 
between stimulus order and delay was also found, F(1.62, 30.71) = 8.07, p < .01, ƞ2 = 0.02. 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t tests showed that in the audition-leading side of the curve, 
the window limits were significantly higher for the 0ms (M = 192, SD = 90) compared with 
the 167.7ms (M = 157, SD = 78) delay, t(19) = 4.89, p < .001, d = .08; the 167.7ms compared 
with the 417.5ms (M = 86, SD = 89) delay, t(19) = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.09; and the 0ms 
compared with the 417.5ms delay, t(19) = 9.73, p < .001, d = 1.67. For the vision-leading 
side, the window limits were significantly higher for the 0ms (M = 293, SD = 102) compared 
with the 167.7ms (M = 244, SD = 131), t(19) = 3.75, p = .001, d = 0.42; and the 0ms 
compared with the 417.5ms (M = 234, SD = 134), t(19) = 3.53, p = .002, d = 0.51. 
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Figure 3. Results from Study 1.2. a) and b) Proportion of ‘simultaneous’ responses as a function of SOAs for 
each delay, fitted to a two-criterion window model, for voluntary and externally-generated conditions, 
respectively. Negative SOAs depict trials where the tone came first. Curves are normalized to the peak. The 
data depictions are provided for illustrative purposes only. Statistical analyses were based on individual data 
fits. c) Estimated WSS across all delays, collapsed across voluntary and externally-generated conditions, 
derived from individual fits. d) Estimated slopes across all delays, collapsed across voluntary and externally- 
generated conditions, derived from individual fits. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. SOAs=stimulus 
onset asynchronies; WSS=window of subjective simultaneity. 
 
 
 
A similar repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the slopes. There was a 
main effect of movement, F(1, 19) = 30.78, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.09 (Figure 3d). The slopes for 
the voluntary condition (M = 118, SD = 7) were significantly steeper the slopes for the self- 
generated condition (M = 160, SD = 11). There was also a main effect of delay, F(1.46, 
27.76) = 4.51, p < .05, ƞ2 = 0.03. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t tests showed that the 
slopes were significantly steeper for 0ms (M = 120, SD = 11) compared with the 167.7ms 
delay (M = 148, SD = 11), t(19) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 2.58, and the 0ms in comparison to 
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the 417.5ms delay (M = 148, SD = 10), t(19) = 2.11, p = .049, d = 2.72. There was also a 
main effect of stimulus order, F(1, 19) = 7.28, p < .01, ƞ2 = 0.07. The slopes for the audition- 
leading side of the curve (M = 119, SD = 9) were significantly steeper than the slopes for 
the vision-leading side of the curve (M = 158, SD = 13), which was again a replication of 
the asymmetry. 
 
 
3.3.3 Preliminary Discussion 
 
In the second experiment, increased tolerance for AV asynchronies around the time 
of action was found, replicating our previous finding. This was also the case for the self- 
generated condition, suggesting that the contribution of action-related predictive 
mechanisms, which was expected to be much better for the voluntary condition, did not in 
fact have an effect on the tolerance for SOAs in simultaneity perception. Delaying the 
presentation of the stimulus pairs after the movement led to decreased tolerance for 
asynchronies both for voluntary and externally-generated movements. The slopes of the 
psychometric functions were significantly steeper for the voluntary in comparison to the 
externally-generated condition. This finding suggests that the participants’ responses in the 
externally-generated condition were more variable. Moreover, the difference in slopes with 
the inclusion of delays suggests that overall SJs had more variance in the presence of 
delays. The finding of asymmetrical window limits and slopes for the audition- and vision- 
leading sides of the SJ curve were replicated. 
 
 
3.4 General Discussion 
In the present experiments, we investigated the perception of simultaneity for 
multisensory stimuli triggered by voluntary or involuntary movements and compared SJs 
when the timing between action and the feedback was and was not contiguous. The WSS 
widened when stimuli were contiguous with the action. Introducing a delay between the 
action and the AV feedback increased sensitivity for AV asynchrony. In other words, the 
decision boundaries for judging the stimuli as simultaneous were significantly wider when 
AV stimuli immediately followed the button press than when a delay was added. Introducing 
a delay of 2500ms, which eliminated contiguity for the action-effect relationship, produced 
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data that were not different from introducing 417.5ms delay, suggesting that 417.5ms was 
enough to break contiguity. The similarity between the voluntary and externally-generated 
conditions suggests that perceiving simultaneity between the AV stimuli was not affected 
by action-related predictive mechanisms. However, the psychometric slopes were steeper 
when participants pressed the button voluntarily as compared to when the movement was 
externally triggered. We now discuss these findings in detail. 
There are a number of possible explanations with regard to our finding of increased 
tolerance of SOA in the perception of simultaneity when the action was time contiguous with 
AV feedback: First, the participants could have become more likely to perceive both 
components as due to their action, and therefore should be linked, which then might have 
led to a shift in the perceived timing of sensory stimuli toward the action. Second, time could 
be perceived as slowed around the point where the action was executed, and therefore it 
was harder to make any kind of temporal judgment. The two explanations presumably lead 
to intentional binding of an action to its consequences. However, each explanation underlies 
a different type of processing of time around the occurrence of an action (Haggard et al., 
2002; Morrone et al., 2005). The first explanation is related to timing shifts toward an action. 
According to this hypothesis, the subjective timing of anticipated action-effect intervals is 
shifted backward in time toward the action, which leads to perceived shortening of action- 
effect intervals (Wenke and Haggard, 2009). In both Study 1.1 and 1.2, the WSS were found 
to be increased for the AV stimulus pair when it immediately followed the movement, 
suggesting a possible time shift for the second sensory stimulus relative to the first sensory 
stimulus that was presented immediately following the action. An alternative explanation 
could be the compression of perceptual time around the point of an action (Morrone et al., 
2005; Wenke and Haggard, 2009). Accordingly, operant movements such as voluntary 
actions cause compression of time around the movement, which is thought to stem from a 
slowed internal clock speed during the movement. This leads to compressed intervals 
between the action and the effect. In this respect, the widened WSS around the time of the 
action in the current studies might correspond to perceptual time slowing down and events 
seeming to be closer together in time than they normally are. Although the finding of poor 
temporal discrimination around a voluntary movement cannot be directly attributed to time 
shift or compression, it suggests that participants are highly tolerant of asynchrony between 
a multisensory stimulus pair when they immediately followed the action. Such tolerance 
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might facilitate perception of synchrony between multisensory action outcomes. The 
findings of the current studies clearly highlight the differential contribution of voluntary 
movements in perceiving multisensory inputs and is in line with the literature on the 
differential processing of sensory information in relation to voluntary movements (Corveleyn 
et al., 2015; Desantis and Haggard, 2016b; Parsons et al., 2013). As in these studies, 
current findings similarly indicate a reduction of temporal asynchrony between sensory 
events attributed to an action. In addition, including delays between a movement and its 
consequences resulted in a similar increase in perceiving asynchronies. These results in 
general underlie the complex relationship between action and perception, adapted to the 
demands of the world we are interacting with. Supporting this view comes from research on 
peripersonal space (PPS). PPS, defined as the region around the body, is important for 
survival as harmful stimulus poses a more likely threat when it is near the body, and our 
interactions with the external world usually occurs within this space (Brozzoli et al., 2011; 
Graziano and Cooke, 2006). When considered in the context of the current studies, PPS 
provides an important clue to the mechanisms underlying the prioritized processing of 
sensory inputs near us or those inputs resulting from our own action. A recent study by Noel 
et al. (2016) addressed this issue by investigating how perception of simultaneity for an AV 
event is influenced by whether they were within or outside the person’s PPS. By 
manipulating the distance of AV events to the body (inside or outside PPS), they found 
significantly higher SJs when the stimuli were within the PPS. The study provides additional 
support to the finding that a more liberal binding criteria within the context of PPS is 
advantageous for an efficient processing of sensory information being in close proximity to 
the body, where interaction with the external world is more likely (Brozzoli et al., 2012; 
Graziano and Cooke, 2006; Rizzolatti et al., 1997). Current findings regarding wider WSSs 
around a movement are in line with Noel et al. (2016), as both studies support flexible 
criteria for binding sensory information when interacting with and reacting to the world. 
Despite the finding on timing distortions linked to voluntary movements, larger 
binding windows for AV stimulus pairs were found around the time of externally-generated 
movements as well. An alternative explanation of these findings therefore involves the 
assumed causal relations between events. Following from a Bayesian view, there is a 
general prior assumption that causally related events are more likely to occur close in time 
and space (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; Hume, 1748). For example, Buehner (2012) 
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demonstrated that predictive relations were constructed not only for voluntary movements 
or intentional agents but also when a machine caused the event. However, in contrast, there 
is also evidence that involuntary movements lead to less binding than voluntary movements 
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2003; Wohlschläger et al., 2003). There are studies suggesting that 
both intentionality of the movement as well as causal relations between the events are 
important (Cravo et al., 2011, 2009; Moore and Haggard, 2008). Current results are more 
in line with this view as increased WSS for AV pairs were both present for voluntary and 
externally-generated conditions, suggesting that contiguity between the button press and 
the AV stimuli led to an increased distortion of time for these events, both when the 
participants were voluntarily initiating them as well as when they were mechanically 
initiated. This view still predicts attraction between causally related events outside of one’s 
own control (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002). In both voluntary and externally-generated 
conditions, a causal relationship between the button press and the appearance of an AV 
pair was present. Nevertheless, an interesting finding emerged in the form of steeper slopes 
for the voluntary condition, suggesting that the participants were more precise in their 
judgments when they were initiating the button press. This points to the differential 
processing for the consequences of voluntary movements and is in line with the finding that 
people are more confident about events that they caused (Stetson et al., 2006). Therefore, 
when the participants voluntarily initiated the movement, they were more confident that the 
AV feedback was simultaneous than when the button press was externally initiated. 
A possible implication for the increased WSS in our study is related to the 
assumption of unity in perceiving synchrony. It has been claimed that intentional binding 
might contribute to the assumption of unity, which is a prerequisite for integrating sensory 
signals (Rohde et al., 2014; Rohde and Ernst, 2013). For two events to be bound, they 
should fall within a window of integration (Bresciani et al., 2005; Shams et al., 2000). 
Following from this, it could be argued that in the current study this prior assumption was 
present, and that the perception of simultaneity was maintained over a range of 
asynchronies for stimuli that were causally linked to a button press be it a voluntary or an 
externally-generated event. 
It should be pointed out that in the current studies, self-generated stimuli were 
predictable in time, while the comparison stimuli occurred at unpredictable times. This could 
be viewed as a plausible and sufficient comparison condition considering the real-world 
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situations where externally-generated movements are often unpredictable. However, in 
their review, Hughes et al. (2012) point to mechanisms other than motor prediction that 
might influence the sensory processing of action effects. Among them is temporal 
prediction, which is defined as ‘‘the ability to predict the point in time at which a sensory 
event will occur’’ (p. 135). In this sense, a stimulus can be predictable in time when it follows 
a voluntary or an externally-generated movement, so long as it occurs at a specified point 
in time after the movement. In the current studies, window limits were similar for the 
voluntary and externally-generated conditions, but the judgments were noisier in the 
externally-generated condition (shallower slopes). This increase in noise could reflect the 
fact that stimuli were less precisely predictable in the externally-generated condition than 
they were following a voluntary button press. 
Research on multisensory binding consistently shows that the brain adapts to the 
prolonged exposure of asynchronous multisensory stimuli to compensate for environmental 
influences as well as differences in the speed of neural processing (Fujisaki et al., 2004; 
Vroomen et al., 2004). Recently, it has been demonstrated that adaptation can take place 
in a rapid fashion, even without consciously attending to the temporal relations between 
sensory inputs (Harvey et al., 2014; Van der Burg et al., 2015, 2013; Van der Burg and 
Goodbourn, 2015). Therefore, we assessed whether current results could be explained by 
rapid recalibration in post hoc analyses. There was no indication of such an effect and 
therefore the possible impact of recalibration in explaining current results were ruled out. 
However, the effect of rapid recalibration would be an interesting topic for future studies. 
It should be noted that although duration of a stimulus is not indicated as a significant 
factor affecting synchrony perception (Vatakis and Spence, 2006), differences in the 
duration of auditory and visual stimuli have been found to influence judgments of synchrony 
(Kuling et al., 2012). This effect is not seen when the durations of both stimuli were matched. 
In the current studies, the durations of the visual and auditory stimuli changed, so as to 
encourage participants to attend to the onsets, and not offsets in judging simultaneity. As a 
result, depending on the SOA, different durations of auditory and visual stimuli were 
presented. Although it has been shown that increases in the absolute duration of 
multisensory stimuli lead to decreases in inter-subject variability of PSS (Boenke et al., 
2009; Kuling et al., 2012), future studies are needed to address the complementary effects 
of duration on the perception of synchrony. 
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Another point concerning the length of stimuli is the possibility that participants in 
the current studies made use of durations rather than onsets in judging simultaneity. There 
is evidence that intervals with an auditory onset are perceived to be longer than intervals 
with an auditory offset (Grondin and Rousseau, 1991; Ortega et al., 2014; Zampini et al., 
2005a, 2005b). However, this effect is found to occur if the onsets and offsets of the auditory 
and visual stimuli are in close temporal proximity to each other (Chen and Yeh, 2009; Klink 
et al., 2011; Romei et al., 2011). In the present studies, although stimulus offsets were 
always the same, the onsets were mostly incongruent. In this sense, the impact of auditory 
stimulus on judging simultaneity might not be an explanation for current findings as 
incongruencies were present more than congruencies. In addition, a recent study by Linares 
and Holcombe (2014) regarding the perception of latency for AV stimuli indicates that the 
asymmetric criterion present in judging simultaneity is not present for duration judgments. 
Considering this and other results on the auditory capture of duration, it could be argued 
that if the decisions were based more on duration rather than on simultaneity, window 
widths and slopes for audition- and vision-leading sides would be similar. Instead, significant 
differences regarding window widths and slopes of the audition- and vision-leading sides 
were observed, suggesting simultaneity to be more relevant for the participants in 
performing the task. 
In conclusion, Study 1.1 and 1.2 show increased tolerance for asynchronies 
between AV stimuli around the time of an action that might facilitate binding of sensory 
signals and compensate for incongruent timing between the senses. A similar pattern 
emerged for externally-generated movements, underlying the importance of causal 
relations between events. Nevertheless, a unique contribution of action-related predictions 
in perceiving simultaneity for events emerged with increased precision for judging 
simultaneity when they follow voluntary movements. 
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4 STUDY 2: NEURAL CORRELATES OF MULTISENSORY 
ACTION OUTCOMES 
 
The content of Study 2 has been published as: 
 
Straube, B., van Kemenade, B.M., Arikan, B.E., Fiehler, K., Leube, D.T., Harris, L.R., 
Kircher, T. (2017). Predicting the Multisensory Consequences of One’s Own Action: BOLD 
Suppression in Auditory and Visual Cortices. PLoS One 12, e0169131. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169131. 
 
 
4.1 Background 
It has been established that the sensory consequences of voluntary actions are 
perceived differently than externally-generated sensory inputs. One observed phenomenon 
for this differential type of processing is the reduced sensation for the outcomes of voluntary 
movements, which is known as sensory suppression (Bays et al., 2005; Blakemore et al., 
1998; Desantis et al., 2012; Shergill et al., 2013). Suppression is thought to be useful for 
the efficient processing of unexpected and salient stimuli, and inferring agency over events 
(Blakemore and Frith, 2003). Recent theories of motor control explain this phenomenon 
within the forward model framework, where an internal model anticipates the sensory 
outcomes of voluntary actions, and monitors whether predicted outcomes match actual 
ones (Blakemore et al., 1999, 1998; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). Efference copies are 
then thought to modulate the neural processing in the corresponding sensory cortex, 
resulting in reduced sensation for the outcomes of voluntary movements (Pynn and 
DeSouza, 2013). Sensory suppression has been studied extensively for somatosensory, 
auditory and visual domains, both on a behavioral (Bays et al., 2006; Cardoso-Leite et al., 
2010; Roussel et al., 2013; Sato, 2008) and neural level (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore 
et al., 1998; Hughes and Waszak, 2011; Lange, 2011; Roussel et al., 2014; Shergill et al., 
2013). As regards neural correlates, voluntary movements have been found to recruit the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), cingulate motor areas/ACC and SMA during 
planning, initiation and execution compared with externally-generated movements 
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(Cunnington et al., 2005, 2002; Deiber et al., 1999; Jenkins et al., 2000b; Lau et al., 2004; 
Mueller et al., 2007; Weiller et al., 1996). Candidate areas proposed to be involved in the 
generation and updating of efferent signals include the SMA (Haggard and Whitford, 2004) 
and the cerebellum (Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore et al., 1998; Knolle et al., 2012; 
Wolpert et al., 1998), whereas inferior parietal regions have been implicated in visuo-motor 
integration (Christensen et al., 2014; Schnell et al., 2007) and processing of action outcome 
discrepancies (Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Farrer et al., 2008). Moreover, studies have 
demonstrated that the behavioral and neural indices of sensory suppression decreases with 
spatiotemporal discrepancies between the predicted and the actual sensory outcome, or 
when the outcome is incongruent with predictions (Bays et al., 2005; Benazet et al., 2016; 
Blakemore et al., 1998; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010). 
These studies, along with others investigating action-related predictive processes 
have mostly focused on unimodal action outcomes. However, voluntary actions in the real 
world often lead to multisensory outcomes. Research on multisensory processing points to 
the facilitatory effect of a certain stimulus modality on another modality when they are 
spatially and/or temporally in synchrony (Diederich and Colonius, 2004; Meredith et al., 
1987; Stein, 2012). On the other hand, there is evidence that one modality can have an 
inhibitory effect on another modality (Colavita, 1974; Meredith, 2002; Morein-Zamir et al., 
2003; Sinnett et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2012). In the case of action-related effects, few 
studies exist which address multisensory influences in the processing of action outcomes 
in the behavioral domain (Desantis et al., 2014; Desantis and Haggard, 2016b; Farrer et al., 
2013; Kawabe et al., 2013; van Kemenade et al., 2016). By demonstrating that multisensory 
inputs associated with voluntary actions modulate time perception for these action 
outcomes compared with unimodal inputs triggered by similar actions, these studies 
underline the influence of multisensory processing on action outcome processing. However, 
despite recent interest in exploring multisensory action outcomes, very few studies have 
been conducted on the issue (Desantis and Haggard, 2016b; Parsons et al., 2013; van 
Kemenade et al., 2016). Moreover, the neural basis of perceiving multisensory action 
outcomes has so far been overlooked. The aim of Study 2 in the present dissertation was 
to investigate neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. bimodal action outcomes in 
comparison with when these sensory inputs are not the result of an action, and just 
passively perceived. To this end, participants were asked to perform voluntary button 
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presses triggering either unimodal auditory or visual vs. bimodal audiovisual outcomes. 
Delays between the button press and the sensory outcome were introduced, and the 
participants were asked to detect whether there was a delay between the button press and 
the outcome of a certain modality. With this design, the aim was to assess how action 
outcomes are perceived as opposed to passive viewing of similar sensory inputs, and how 
temporal discrepancies between the action and the outcome affect perceptual judgments. 
It was expected that delay detection would be higher for multisensory action outcomes 
compared with unimodal sensory stimuli, because additional modality would provide extra 
timing information about the action outcome. It was also expected that voluntary movements 
would lead to suppressed BOLD activity in sensory areas. Moreover, BOLD suppression 
effects would be present both when the action would lead to unimodal and bimodal 
outcomes, as both outcomes are equally likely. BOLD activity related to the detection of 
delays (subjective delay detection) was examined in order to address differences in brain 
areas when an action outcome was perceived as not delayed as opposed to when a delay 
was detected. It was also assumed that subjective delay detection-related BOLD activity 
would be influenced by whether the sensory outcome was unimodal or bimodal. Finally, 
possible task-related effects were also investigated in order to address differences in 
performing auditory vs. visual delay detection task, as it has been previously found that 
temporal perception might differ with regard to whether the target stimulus is auditory or 
visual (Repp and Penel, 2002). 
 
 
4.2 Materials and Methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
21 healthy, right-handed participants confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part in the 
experiment (13 females, age range 19±30, mean age 24.9 years). One participant had to 
be excluded from the fMRI analysis because of excessive movement, resulting in a sample 
of twenty participants (12 females, age range 19±30, mean age = 25.1 years). The study 
was approved by the local ethics committee and in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
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4.2.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
 
During fMRI data acquisition participants wore headphones (MR-Confon Optimel, 
Magdeburg, Germany) through which auditory stimuli were delivered in the form of a pure- 
tone 250Hz beep. The visual stimulus was a black dot (1.5° visual angle), presented 
centrally in front of a medium grey background via a computer screen (60Hz screen refresh 
rate) positioned behind the scanner, and viewed via an angled mirror inside the MRI 
scanner. The duration of unimodal visual and auditory, as well as bimodal audiovisual 
stimuli was 1000ms. Stimuli were presented using Octave and Psychtoolbox-3 (Brainard, 
1997). 
An event-related fMRI design was used. The experimental paradigm used in Study 
2 was adapted from a previous study (van Kemenade et al., 2016). However, due to 
technical reasons an externally-controlled button could not be included in the present study. 
Instead, a passive condition has been utilized whereby similar sensory stimuli triggered by 
button presses were shown after a cue. Participants were instructed to place index finger 
of their right hand on a button pad fixed to their leg via straps. Using the button pad, they 
were asked to perform button presses with their right index finger, which would elicit the 
appearance of either a dot on the screen, or a tone, or both. The stimuli were presented 
either at the time of the button press, or with a variable delay (0, 83, 167, 250, 334, 417ms, 
determined based on the screen refresh rate). In bimodal trials, delays were always of the 
same duration for both modalities. The task of the participants was to detect whether there 
was a delay between the button press and the accompanying stimuli of a certain modality. 
In other words, participants had to report delays in one modality in each trial, referred to as 
task modality. Thus, in bimodal trials participants only had to report whether they detected 
a delay between the button press and the visual or the auditory stimulus. In the passive 
condition, they were instructed to perform no button presses. Instead, they were asked to 
attend to the sensory stimuli presented, and to report whether there was one or two sensory 
stimuli. This control condition was selected for two reasons. First, with this condition, the 
participant had to attend to sensory stimuli, similar to that during the voluntary action 
condition. Second, the simplicity of the task did not require for more attention, making it 
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unlikely that the expected suppression effects in the voluntary condition were confounded 
by increased task demand in the passive condition. 
The experiment consisted of 5 blocks, in which voluntary conditions with different 
task modalities, along with one passive mini-block were presented in alternating order 
(visual-auditory-passive-visual-auditory, counterbalanced across participants). At the start 
of each mini-block, the task to be performed was presented (auditory, visual or passive). 
Each block comprised 60 trials in total, with 12 trials per mini-block. Unimodal and bimodal 
trials were randomly presented within each mini-block. The fMRI experiment comprised 300 
trials in total: there were 10 trials for each delay per condition, leading to 60 voluntary 
unimodal visual trials (VolUniVis), 60 voluntary unimodal auditory trials (VolUniAud), 60 
voluntary bimodal visual trials (VolBiVis) and 60 bimodal auditory trials (VolBiAud). 
Furthermore, unimodal and bimodal passive control conditions were presented: 20 visual 
unimodal (PasUniVis), 20 auditory unimodal (PasUniAud) and 20 bimodal (PasBiAV). 
Each experimental trial began with a fixation cross having variable inter-trial interval 
(1000-1500-2000ms). Subsequently, a square (3.2 degrees visual angle) surrounding the 
fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen, comprising the cue. In the voluntary 
condition, the participants were instructed to perform button presses at their own pace in a 
fixed time window up to 4000ms after the cue onset. In this respect, they had some freedom 
in when to initiate the movement. This was done to encourage a self-initiated button press 
rather than an automatic reflex to the cue (Rohde and Ernst, 2013). The button press 
triggered either a unimodal or a bimodal stimulus pair after one of the six delays. The visual 
stimulus appeared at the location of the fixation cross, thus obscuring it. For unimodal 
auditory trials the fixation cross remained visible during the presentation of the tone. The 
cue and stimuli disappeared at the same time. Subsequent to the offset of the stimuli and 
cue, there was a variable interval with the fixation cross before the question ` Delay? Yes/No' 
was presented on the screen, after a fixed period of six seconds after cue onset. They 
answered `Yes, there was a delay' by pressing a button with their left middle finger, or `No, 
there was no delay' by pressing a button with their left index finger. The left index and middle 
fingers were placed on two buttons of a separate button pad fixed to the left leg. In the 
passive condition, participants were instructed not to perform any button presses, but to just 
observe and listen to the presented stimuli after the cue. In these trials, the stimuli were 
presented automatically after a variable delay (500±3500ms) followed by a fixation cross. 
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The time from the start of the cue to the offset of the stimulus presentation was also 6000ms. 
After that, participants had to judge whether one or two stimuli had been presented, by 
pressing with their left middle finger for ‘Yes, there were two stimuli’, or left index finger for 
‘No, there was only one stimulus’ to the question ‘Two stimuli? Yes/no’. The participants 
were given up to 2500ms for their answer. In addition, they were instructed to be as accurate 
as possible, but were not required to be as fast as possible. After the response, the next 
trial began. Missing trials in which no responses were registered were not repeated to 
maintain a fixed data acquisition procedure for all experimental runs and participants. 
Experimental trials regarding voluntary and passive conditions were depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. An example of a bimodal trial. In the voluntary condition (top) participants pressed the button at a time 
of their preference (max. 4000ms) after the appearance of the cue. After a variable delay, unimodal or bimodal 
stimuli were presented. Participants had to report whether there was a delay between their button press and the 
stimulus of the task modality. In the passive condition (bottom), an identical trial structure was used. However, 
no button press was performed, and the participants had to report whether they perceived one or two stimuli. 
 
 
 
Approximately a week prior to the fMRI experiment, participants familiarized 
themselves with the task in a behavioral training outside the scanner. In the behavioral 
training, they initially practiced the button presses and with different sensory outcomes that 
could be initiated by the button presses. They then familiarized themselves with the delays, 
first with only 0 and the 417ms delays. They were also presented with the passive condition. 
Subsequently, they completed one run just as in the fMRI experiment, receiving feedback 
about their performance at the end of each trial. This was followed by two more runs, this 
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time without feedback. Only those subjects having a performance of higher than 50% 
correct detection were invited to the fMRI experiment, as this was necessary to distinguish 
detection-related processes. All 21 participants met this criterion. 
 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Behavioral data analysis 
 
Proportion of delay responses across each task and modality were calculated. In 
addition, average delay for detected and undetected trials were assessed for each 
condition. Statistical analyses were conducted on proportion of delay responses as well as 
average delay per condition. Button press latencies across conditions were extracted, and 
used to assess possible correlations between performance and movement initiation. 
Analyses were conducted on proportion delay responses and delays per condition. When 
necessary, Bonferroni corrected t tests were conducted for post hoc analyses. 
 
 
4.3.2 fMRI data acquisition and analysis 
 
MRI data were collected using a Siemens 3 Tesla MR Magnetom Trio Trim scanner. 
A total of 396 transversal functional images were acquired during each experimental run 
(echo-planar images, 64 x 64 matrix; 34 slices descending; field of view [FoV] = 230mm; 
repetition time [TR] = 1650ms; echo time [TE] = 30ms; flip angle = 70 ̊; slice thickness = 
4.0mm, gap size: 15%, and voxel resolution = 3 x 3 x 4.6mm) covering the whole brain. 
Preprocessing and subsequent analyses were performed using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping (SPM12; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) implemented in MATLAB 7.9 
(Mathworks, Sherborn, Massachusetts). Preprocessing was comprised of standard 
realignment, coregistration between structural and functional scans, segmentation, 
normalisation (Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI] template 2 x 2 x 2mm) and smoothing 
(8mm). 
Single subject analyses were conducted using a high-pass filter with a cut-off period 
of 128 seconds. Realignment parameters were modelled as regressors of no interest to 
account for movement-related artifacts. Two analyses were performed. In the first analysis, 
STUDY 2 
53 
 
 
 
 
hemodynamic responses triggered by visual, auditory or bimodal stimuli during each 
condition  (VolUniVis,  VolUniAud,  VolBiVis,  VolBiAud,  PasUniVis,  PasUniAud,  PasUniAV)  
was modeled with a canonical HRF. In the second analysis,  voluntary  trials  were 
grouped according to whether a delay was detected or not (subjective delay detection: 
detected and undetected). Button presses were also included as a condition of  no 
interest. Parameter estimates (beta values) and t-statistic images were calculated for each 
subject. 
On the second level, two random effects analyses were performed. In the first 
analysis, parameter estimates of the seven conditions (VolUniVis, VolUniAud, VolBiVis, 
VolBiAud, PasUniVis, PasUniAud, PasUniAV) were added into flexible factorial model. 
Expected effects and corresponding contrasts of interest were a) BOLD suppression 
for voluntary movements, by contrasting each control condition with the respective voluntary 
condition (PasUniVis > VolUniVis, PasUniAud > VolUniAud, PasUniAV > VolBiVis, PasUniAV > 
VolBiAud), b) task and modality-independent BOLD suppression, by conjunction analyses 
[(PasUniVis > VolUniVis) ∩ (PasUniAud > VolUniAud) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiVis) ∩ (PasUniAV > 
VolBiAud)], c) differential processing of voluntary movements by contrasting voluntary with 
passive trials [(VolUniVis + VolUniAud + VolBiVis + VolBiAud) > (PasUniVis + PasUniAud + 
PasUniAV)]. In the second analysis, parameter estimates for detected and undetected trials 
(detected vs. undetected) were entered into a flexible factorial design. Three subjects were 
excluded from this analysis due to insufficient number of trials per experimental run, 
resulting in seventeen participants (10 females, age range 19±30, mean age = 25 years). 
Contrasts of interests for this analysis were a) detected > undetected trials to assess 
whether BOLD activity differs with the detection of delays, b) detected > undetected using 
an inclusive mask to cover sensory brain regions found in the conjunction analysis, in order 
to explore possible BOLD suppression effects for undetected trials. Furthermore, possible 
interactions between detection and modality were also assessed. 
Separate analyses were conducted to assess the potential influence of button press 
on findings. Accordingly, time during button press was not modelled (as a condition of no 
interest) in the first and the second analysis. Contrasts of interest were the same as in the 
first and second analyses. 
To correct for multiple comparisons, family-wise error correction (FWE) correction 
at p < 0.05 was implemented. In order to avoid Type II error, the results were additionally 
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assessed using p < 0.001 uncorrected, with a cluster extent of 50 contiguous resampled 
voxels. This is above the cluster threshold calculated by Monte Carlo simulations, which 
resulted in a minimum cluster size of 47 resampled voxels to achieve correction for multiple 
comparisons at p < 0.05, assuming an individual voxel type I error of p = 0.001 (Slotnick et 
al., 2003). AAL toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and the probabilistic cytoarchitectonic 
maps (Eickhoff et al., 2005) were used to label significant activations, based on peak 
activation voxels. 
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Behavioral results 
 
A 2(Modality: unimodal vs. bimodal) x 2(Task: visual vs. auditory) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on proportion delay responses. There was a main effect 
of modality and task; F(1,19) = 6.809, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.264, and F(1,19) = 9.541, p = 
0.006, η2p = 0.334, respectively (see Figure 5). No interaction effect was found; F(1,19) = 
2.861, p = 0.107, η2p = 0.131. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of delay detection in the voluntary condition as a function of task and modality. In both 
tasks, bimodal trials showed more delay responses than unimodal trials. Error bars denote standard error of the 
mean. 
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A repeated measures 2(Modality: unimodal vs. bimodal) x 2(Task: visual vs. 
auditory) ANOVA on button press latencies showed no significant differences across 
conditions. Additional correlation analyses revealed no significant correlation between 
button press latencies and performance in the task. Latency of the button press as a 
potential confounding factor was therefore ruled out. 
Finally, performances in the passive task were calculated. The overall performances 
for the passive task suggested ceiling effects as indicated by extremely high accuracy rates, 
PasUniVis mean = 98.33%, SD = 4.36; PasUniAud mean = 98.75%, SD = 3.05; PasBiAV mean 
=  97.91%,  SD = 3.70.  There  were  no significant differences in the performances across 
passive tasks (p > 0.49). 
 
 
 
4.4.2 fMRI results 
 
Passive > voluntary contrast across conditions (PasUniVis > VolUniVis, PasUniAud > 
VolUniAud, PasUniAV > VolBiVis, PasUniAV > VolBiAud) revealed significantly reduced BOLD 
responses in bilateral posterior occipital cortices, bilateral temporal cortices and the left 
motor cortex. Conjunction analyses across these contrasts [(PasUniVis > VolUniVis) ∩ 
(PasUniAud > VolUniAud) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiVis) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiAud)] suggest that BOLD 
suppression effects were overall independent of task or modality (see Table I and Figure 
6). Voluntary > passive contrast [(VolUniVis + VolUniAud + VolBiVis + VolBiAud) > (PasUniVis 
+ PasUniAud + PasUniAV)] revealed significant differences in right pre-/postcentral gyrus 
(MNI: x, y, z = 38 -22 54, T = 9.72, kE = 796, pFWE < 0.05), left medial occipital lobe (MNI: x, 
y, z = -4 -86 -8, T=7.91, kE=2742, pFWE < 0.05), lingual gyrus/precuneus (MNI: x, y, z = 2 - 
54 2, T = 5.29, kE = 36, pFWE < 0.05) and left hippocampus (MNI: x, y, z = -26 -36 10, T = 
5.13, kE = 8, pFWE < 0.05). 
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Figure 6. Results of the fMRI analysis regarding BOLD suppression a) Conjunction analysis for the suppression 
effect across conditions ([(PasUniVis > VolUniVis) ∩ (PasUniAud > VolUniAud) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiVis) ∩ (PasUniAV 
> VolBiAud)]); b) Contrast estimates of activation clusters for suppression effects in the right auditory (dark gray) 
and visual (light gray) cortex, respectively. c) Suppression effects for each individual condition. All contrasts at 
pFWE < .05. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. VolUniVis = voluntary unimodal visual, VolUniAud= 
voluntary unimodal auditory, VolBiVis = voluntary bimodal visual, VolBiAud = voluntary bimodal auditory, 
PasUniVis = passive visual, PasUniAud = passive auditory, PasUniAV = passive audiovisual. 
 
 
 
Although BOLD suppression effects were found to be weaker in bilateral visual (MNI: 
x, y, z = 38 -54 -14, T = 5.21, pFWE < 0.05; MNI: x, y, z = 46 -52 -12, T = 4.32, pFWE = 0.258) 
and auditory cortices (MNI: x, y, z = 52 -50 18, T = 4.69, pFWE = 0.080; MNI: x, y, z = -64 - 
44 10, T = 2.70, p < 0.01 uncorrected) when button presses were not modelled, it was still 
present. However, activity in the left motor cortex was not present anymore, and instead 
switched to the right hemisphere (MNI: x, y, z = 36 -16 52, T = 5.46, kE = 860). These results 
suggest that activity differences in the voluntary and passive conditions should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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In the second analysis, BOLD suppression for undetected compared with detected 
trials (detected > undetected) were tested using an inclusive mask of visual and auditory 
cortices found to weaker in the conjunction analysis. Reduced BOLD activity was found for 
undetected compared with detected trials in bilateral occipital (MNI: x, y, z=-16 -96 -6, T = 
4.76, kE = 311, p < 0.001 uncorrected; MNI: x, y, z = 24 -92 -14, T = 4.31, kE = 99, p < 0.001 
uncorrected) and temporal (MNI: x, y, z = 60 -28 8, T = 4.37, kE = 81, p < 0.001 uncorrected; 
MNI: x, y, z = -56 -32 12, T = 3.88, kE = 60, p < 0.001 uncorrected) areas of the brain (see 
Table II and Figure 7) When button presses were not modelled, the results were slightly 
different; bilateral occipital (MNI: x, y, z = -16 -94 -6, T = 4.22, p < 0.001 uncorrected; MNI: 
x, y, z = 26 -92 -12, T = 3.59) and temporal (MNI: x, y, z = 60 -28 8, T = 3.65; MNI: x, y, z 
=-52 -32 14, T = 3.08) for detected > undetected contrast. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Suppression effects for subjectively undetected compared with detected trials in a) visual and b) 
auditory cortices. Data are inclusively masked by the suppression effect illustrated in Figure 6a. Bar graphs at 
the right illustrate suppression effects in visual (top) and auditory (bottom) cortices across conditions as a 
function of the delay between the action and the stimulus. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
For all contrasts, p < 0.001 uncorrected with minimum cluster extension of 50 voxels. 
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Delay detection-related BOLD activity (detected > undetected contrast) at the whole 
brain level revealed activity differences in left parahippocampus (MNI: x, y, z = -30 -34 -12, 
T = 5.58, kE = 27, pFWE < .05), the right precuneus (MNI: x, y, z = 14 -60 22, T = 5.53, kE = 
19, pFWE < .05) and the left putamen/insula (MNI: x, y, z = -28 -2 -2, T = 5.16, kE = 7, pFWE < 
.05). At a more liberal threshold (p < 0.001, 50 voxels), medial prefrontal lobe, anterior and 
posterior cingulate cortex (ACC/PCC), temporal poles, parietal and hippocampal structures 
emerged (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. FMRI results for subjectively undetected compared with detected trials (p < 0.001 uncorrected with 
minimum cluster extension of 50 voxels). Bar graph illustrates contrast estimates of the left hippocampus at a 
cluster level (pFWE < 0.05) and the bilateral ACC cluster (p < 0.001 uncorrected; for statistics see Table II). 
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Undetected > detected contrast revealed activity differences in the right inferior 
frontal gyrus (MNI: x, y, z = 52 20 6, T = 4.42, kE = 149, p < 0.001 uncorrected; MNI: x, y, z 
= 34 26 -6; T = 3.93, kE = 73, p < 0.001 uncorrected). 
 
Analysis exploring the interaction between task and modality on subjective delay 
detection revealed no effects on the conservative FWE level. At a more liberal threshold (p 
< 0.001 uncorrected, 50 voxels), a significant interaction between detection and modality 
was found in the left cerebellum (62.0% in left lobule VI, 9.3% in lobule V) extending to the 
fusiform gyrus (MNI: x, y, z = -32 -48 -26, F = 20.41, kE = 182, p < 0.053 FWE cluster 
corrected; see Figure 9). Contrast estimates corresponding to the respective cluster showed 
significant differences between detected vs. undetected trials for the bimodal (detected > 
undetected, MNI: x, y, z = -30 -34 -28, T = 5.82, kE = 156, pFWE < .001), compared with the 
unimodal condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. fMRI results showing activation of the left cerebellum with cluster extensions in the left fusiform gyrus 
for the interaction of delay detection and modality. Bar graph depicts contrast estimates of the respective cluster 
illustrate a specific activation for detected compared with undetected trials in the bimodal conditions. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. p < 0.001 uncorrected with minimum cluster extension of 50 voxels. 
 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Study 2 assessed neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. bimodal action 
outcomes triggered by voluntary movements vs. viewed passively, and subjective delay 
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detection-related BOLD responses. Accordingly, voluntary button presses performed by 
participants led to either unimodal visual/auditory or bimodal AV stimuli after various delays, 
and the task of the participants was to detect delays between the button press and the 
sensory outcome of a specific modality. In passive trials, participants were asked to report 
the number of modalities, which could be only visual, only auditory or AV, presented after a 
cue. Proportion of delay detection was found to be higher for bimodal compared with 
unimodal trials, and when the task was visual compared with when it was auditory. Analysis 
on fMRI data revealed BOLD suppression in somatosensory, visual and auditory processing 
regions when the stimuli were triggered by voluntary movements as opposed to when the 
stimuli were passively perceived. Moreover, BOLD suppression was found to be higher for 
subjectively detected compared with undetected trials. Analysis of BOLD activity associated 
with subjective delay detection revealed an interaction between detection and modality in 
the left cerebellum, suggesting that when the outcome was unimodal, activity in this area 
was less pronounced for detected trials than when it was bimodal, in which case, an 
opposite pattern emerged. This result, along with higher delay detection responses for 
bimodal trials point to the influence of additional modality on the perception of voluntary 
actions and their outcomes. 
As expected, BOLD suppression was found in visual, somatosensory and auditory 
regions of the brain during voluntary actions. Suppression effects were also similar across 
modalities compared with similar sensory inputs observed passively. This result points to 
predictive processing of voluntary action outcomes whereby equally likely action outcomes 
were anticipated and subsequently suppressed (Bays et al., 2006; Voss et al., 2008). 
Moreover, reduced BOLD responses in auditory and visual cortices were strongest for 
subjectively undetected trials. This was to be expected, as subjective detection of delays 
increased linearly with the inclusion of physical delays. 
Existing research on multisensory processing has demonstrated that a certain 
stimulus modality can facilitate the processing of another modality, especially when they 
are temporally and/or spatially in synchrony (Diederich and Colonius, 2004; Meredith et al., 
1987; Stein, 2012). Results of Study 2 were in line with this, in that additional sensory 
modality facilitated behavioral performance, as evidenced by increased detection 
responses when the action outcome was audiovisual. 
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Regarding detection-related BOLD activity, cerebellum was found to be involved in 
subjective detection of delays, and more so when the sensory outcome was bimodal. This 
result supports previous findings on cerebellum’s role in error-related processing of 
voluntary action outcomes (Blakemore et al., 2001; S. Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert et 
al., 1995). In addition, it suggests that the additional sensory modality was associated with 
increased error-related processing. Therefore, it seems in general that multisensory stimuli 
facilitated detection performance, which was accompanied by increased activity in the 
cerebellum. Other areas found to be involved for subjectively delayed trials were the ACC 
and the hippocampus. ACC has been consistently implicated in monitoring of action and 
behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1998; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Matsumoto 
et al., 2007). Higher involvement of this area for subjectively detected trials support the role 
of ACC in detecting temporal discrepancies between actions and their sensory outcomes. 
Together, findings of Study 2 provide supporting evidence for BOLD suppression 
with regard to voluntary action outcomes, and error-related action outcome processing in 
the cerebellum. Importantly, the present findings extend BOLD suppression to multisensory 
action outcomes, suggest predictive processing of equally likely sensory outcomes linked 
with voluntary movements, and show modulatory effect of the additional sensory modality 
on error-related processing in the cerebellum. 
Despite these novel findings, one limitation that needs consideration is the different 
task demands across voluntary and passive conditions. Whereas in the voluntary condition 
participants were asked to focus on a single modality and detect delays between the button 
press and this single modality, in the passive condition they were required to report the 
number of modalities presented in a trial. In this sense, the tasks required different aspects 
of the sensory stimuli to be attended. Moreover, stimulus presentation in the passive 
condition was unpredictable in time, compared with stimulus presentation in the voluntary 
condition which was more or less predictable by the button press. Research on action 
outcome processing underlies the influence of temporal predictability, predictability of the 
stimulus occurrence in time, which is different than prediction regarding action outcome 
related processing (Hughes et al., 2012). Future studies should distinguish temporal 
predictability of the sensory stimuli from predictive processing of action outcomes. A related 
limitation of Study 2 was the fact that when button presses were not modelled as a condition 
of no interest, results regarding BOLD suppression effects were weaker. Efference copy- 
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related predictive processing can be better investigated with contrasting voluntary 
movements with their externally-generated counterparts. This enables re-afferent feedback 
to be similar across different movements, and makes it possible to study the contribution of 
the efferent signal (Weiskrantz et al., 1971). 
To conclude, Study 2 investigated neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. 
bimodal outcomes associated with voluntary button presses as opposed to passive viewing 
of these sensory inputs. Findings showed BOLD suppression in sensory cortices which was 
independent of task and modality, along with increased BOLD activity in these areas for 
subjectively delayed as opposed to undelayed trials. In addition, detection of delays were 
coupled with increased activity in the ACC and hippocampus, which is in line with existing 
evidence on the role of these areas in action monitoring. Furthermore, the cerebellum was 
found to be modulated not only by voluntary actions, but also by whether the outcome was 
unimodal or bimodal, with increased activity in bimodal trials, corroborating its role in 
processing temporal discrepancies in the predicted action outcome relationship. Together, 
these findings support predictive processing of voluntary action outcomes and extend it to 
multisensory outcomes of voluntary movements. 
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5 STUDY 3: NEURAL CORRELATES OF MULTISENSORY 
ACTION OUTCOMES: ADDRESSING EFFERENCE COPY- 
RELATED PREDICTIONS AND NATURALISTIC ACTION 
OUTCOMES 
 
The content of Study 3 has been submitted for a publication as: 
 
Arikan, B.E., van Kemenade, B.M., Podranski, K., Steinsträter O., Straube, B., Kircher, T. 
(under review). Neural correlates of perceiving multisensory action outcomes in an 
ecologically valid set-up: BOLD suppression in sensory cortices and multisensory 
influences. 
 
 
5.1 Background 
In Study 2, neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. multimodal action outcomes 
was investigated in which unimodal and bimodal visual and auditory stimuli presented at 
various delays after a button press were compared to identical, but action unrelated, 
unpredictable control stimuli (Straube et al., 2017). Reduced BOLD activity was found in 
somatosensory, visual and auditory cortices for voluntary action outcomes compared with 
passive viewing of similar sensory stimuli, suggesting sensory suppression at a neural level. 
In addition, increased BOLD responses were found in sensory areas associated with 
additional task unrelated modality, independent of whether the outcome actually occurred 
or not. The conclusion was that the internal model and related cerebellar functions might 
take all possible action outcomes into account when these outcomes are equally likely. On 
a behavioral level, increased delay detection responses were observed for bimodal trials 
when the stimuli were self-generated, suggesting that the additional modality is 
advantageous for the monitoring of action outcomes. Moreover, a modulation in the left 
cerebellum by judgments of delay and modality, along with an increased cerebellar activity 
in bimodal compared with unimodal trials for voluntary movements point to differential 
involvement of cerebellum for processing multisensory action outcomes. 
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Despite these novel findings on multisensory processing of action outcomes, Study 
2 had a number of limitations. First, the control condition in Study 2 involved passive viewing 
of sensory stimuli. Although this condition might address the influence of voluntary 
movements on the perception of sensory inputs by factoring out mere sensory processing, 
it cannot refer to the specific influence of efference copy-related predictive processes. 
Externally-generated movements, on the other hand, might prove more efficient in 
distinguishing efference copy-related predictive processes that are specific to voluntary 
movements. Sensory stimuli that are self-generated produce both efferent and re-afferent 
information whereas sensory outcomes generated externally provide only re-afferent 
information (Weiskrantz et al., 1971). By contrasting both movement types, the influence of 
efference copy-related predictive processes can be more effectively identified. Second, 
actions and their consequences in the real world are more complex than a button press 
triggering a dot. Although button presses as well as computer-generated sensory inputs are 
easier to control and manipulate, more studies are needed to demonstrate that similar 
mechanisms are at work in real life, and for relatively complex movements (Benazet et al., 
2016; Ingram and Wolpert, 2011). 
The main purpose of Study 3 was to investigate neural correlates of perceiving 
voluntary and externally-generated movements of the hand leading to unimodal or bimodal 
outcomes, and at the same time address issues raised with regard to Study 2. To this end, 
participants were asked to perform wrist movements using the handle of a custom-made 
passive movement device (PMD). Half of the trials involved an externally-generated 
movement condition in which the PMD moved the hand automatically. This condition 
allowed for addressing the specific role of efference copy-related processing during 
voluntary movements, as opposed to re-afferent feedback arising as a result of both 
movements. The movements were recorded with a camera and displayed to the participants 
in real-time, which allowed for a better representation of realistic action outcome 
associations and for testing whether similar processes are at work in an ecologically-valid 
experimental set-up compared with relatively abstract movement outcome associations 
previously used. Action outcome discrepancies were induced by systematically introducing 
delays between the movement and the visual feedback of the movement (unimodal 
condition). The task of the participants was to report whether they detected a delay between 
the actual movement and the visual feedback or not. Half of the trials involved an auditory 
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beep coupled to the onset of the visual feedback (bimodal condition). With this condition, 
the aim was to assess whether an additional modality, even though not directly related to 
the task, would influence perception of temporal discrepancies between the action and the 
visual feedback as it bares information about delays. Based on findings of Study 2 
concerning BOLD suppression (Straube et al., 2017), it was expected that there would be 
reduced processing in sensory areas for voluntary compared with externally-generated 
movements. In addition, whether voluntary movements were expected to yield increased 
BOLD activity in areas such as DLPFC, ACC and SMA previously attributed to voluntary 
movements (Cunnington et al., 2005, 2002; Deiber et al., 1999; Jenkins et al., 2000a; Lau 
et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2007; Weiller et al., 1996). Because unimodal 
and bimodal outcomes would be equally likely, reduced BOLD activity would be expected 
in auditory processing areas both for unimodal and bimodal conditions. It was also 
hypothesized that the auditory stimulus triggered by the voluntary movement would provide 
additional timing information about the temporal discrepancy between the movement and 
visual feedback, aiding in delay detection performance. Finally, neural correlates of 
subjective delay detection across different movements and modalities would be 
investigated in order to assess whether detection-related BOLD responses were be 
influenced by movement and modality. 
 
 
5.2 Materials and Methods 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
23 right-handed students (11 females, mean age = 25.83±3.09 years) from Philipps 
University Marburg participated in the behavioral training and fMRI scanning. One 
participant who took part in the behavioral training was not included in the fMRI study due 
to an increased bias to report delays even for the 0ms delay (see Experimental Design and 
Procedure for details). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing, as well as no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders, and no current use of psychoactive medications. 
Right-handedness was confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 
The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee and performed in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants were paid for their participation. Three 
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participants were excluded from the final analyses due to excessive head movement (n = 
1) or technical issues (n = 2), resulting in a final sample of 20 participants (9 females, 
age=26±3.24). 
 
 
5.2.2 Apparatus 
 
A custom-made MR-compatible PMD was used for the execution of both voluntary 
and externally-generated movements. The device was built using non-ferromagnetic 
materials (PVC, titan). A handle was designed for the execution of the movement, with a 
horizontal trajectory. Importantly, the movement range of the handle, and therefore the to- 
be-executed movement, was restricted, so that movement range would remain constant 
throughout trials and for different movement types. Approximate movement range was ~30° 
and ~5.5 cm (see Figure 10a). Motion to the device could be induced automatically with 
compressed air (6 bar). Approximate force used when the device was working automatically 
was 20N. 
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Figure 10. a) Custom-made PMD. Movement trajectory was horizontal, and the range of movement from one 
end to another was ~30. b) Outlook of the experimental set-up. MRI-compatible camera recorded and displayed 
hand movements in real time during self- or externally-generated movements. c) Visual display shown to the 
participant, comprising the visual outcome of the movement. 
 
 
 
An MR–compatible camera (MRC High Speed, MRC Systems GmbH, Heidelberg, 
Germany) with 2ms refresh rate was used to record movements of the hand. The camera 
was mounted to an adjustable custom-made support. Auditory beeps were presented via 
MR-compatible headphones (MR-Confon, Optimel, Magdeburg, Germany). Responses 
were given using MR-compatible button pads (Cedrus, Lumina, San Pedro, USA). Visual 
display of the movement recorded by the camera in real-time was presented on a mirror- 
projected computer screen (60Hz refresh rate). Five LEDs were attached to the device, for 
the purpose of detecting movement onsets. A motion detection algorithm written specifically 
for this study was applied to the camera images, detecting the spatial position of one moving 
LED with regard to the four fixed LEDs in each camera frame. For each trial, movement 
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onset was defined as a minimum of 1° change in the relative position of the moving LED 
within one frame (requiring an increase of at least 0.5° per frame). Delays were presented 
from movement onset onwards. All equipment was controlled by custom written software 
running on a personal computer (Dell Optiplex 9020, Intel Core i5-4570, 4 Cores, 3.2 GHz, 
4GB RAM). 
 
 
5.2.3 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
An event-related design was used. On each trial, the participant was asked to 
perform wrist movements (extension and flexion) with the right hand using the handle of the 
PMD. The movements were recorded by the camera, and presented to the participant in 
real time via mirror-projection, constituting the visual outcome of the movement (see Figure 
10b & c). Six delays (0, 83, 167, 250, 330 and 417ms, determined based on the screen 
refresh rate) were introduced between the movement and the real time display of the 
movement. The participants were asked to judge whether there was a delay between actual 
movement of their hand movement and visual outcome of the movement. Half of the trials 
contained 440Hz sine-wave pure tones (500ms), which were presented with the same delay 
used to delay the visual outcome. The task remained the same in these trials. 
One week prior to scanning, participants completed a behavioral training in order to 
familiarize themselves with the task. To this end, the participants were initially trained to 
perform hand movements both in the voluntary and externally-generated conditions. 
Accordingly, they were instructed to grab the handle of the PMD, and move the handle from 
left to right and then back in approximately 1500ms, while trying to maintain a constant pace 
with the help of a metronome. They then practiced externally-generated movement 
condition by grabbing the handle of the PMD while trying to relax the hand and wrist as 
much as possible, and letting the device move their wrist. In order to prevent participants 
from using visual cues from the hand, a curtain was placed to hide the right hand from 
participants’ sight. Participants executed both movements first without and then with the 
visual display recorded by the camera and presented in real-time via a computer screen. 
The participants were instructed to observe the displayed movement on the screen, and to 
judge whether there was a delay between their actual movement and the visual outcome of 
the movement or not. They were also told that in some trials they would also receive auditory 
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beeps, but this was not related to the task. Participants first completed trials with no delay 
and 417ms delay, and received feedback indicating whether they answered correctly. They 
then completed three runs that were similar in length to the main experimental runs in the 
scanning sessions. Each run contained a voluntary and an external movement block (mini- 
blocks) in alternating order (144 trials in total). The order of movement type was 
counterbalanced across participants. Because being able to detect the delays was crucial 
for the paradigm, only participants who detected at least 50% of delays or more at the most 
extreme delay, and who reported detecting a delay less than 50% of the 0ms delay trials, 
were invited to the fMRI experiment. One participant did not fulfill this criteria, and was 
therefore not invited to the fMRI experiment. The training procedure took approximately one 
hour. 
In the fMRI experiment, participants were positioned inside the bore in supine 
position, with their right hand placed on the PMD handle which was located besides them. 
Each participant received five experimental blocks, each of which contained two mini-blocks 
(voluntary and externally-generated movements, each having 24 trials) in counterbalanced 
order. At the beginning of each mini-block, the participant was informed about the 
movement type they had to perform (voluntary or externally-generated). Each trial started 
with a cue, ‘Ready’, that lasted for 1500ms. This cue indicated that participants had to 
prepare themselves for the upcoming movement. Immediately after the disappearance of 
the cue, the camera was turned on for 4000ms. This timing frame was chosen to give 
participants some freedom in performing a self-generated, intentional movement. The 
participant was instructed to perform the movement (in the voluntary mini-block), or let the 
device move their hand (in the external mini-block). The onset of the externally-generated 
trial was jittered (500-1000-1500ms). The participants saw their hand movement on the 
screen in real time or with one of five delays. After a 500ms interval, the question ‘Delay?’ 
appeared on the screen. Participants used their left index and middle finger to respond ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’. Button assignment was counterbalanced across participants. Maximum time 
allowed for the response was 2000ms. Following the response, an intertrial interval of 2000- 
5000ms was presented. Unimodal and bimodal trials were randomized within blocks. Total 
number of trials for each participant was 240. Participants were allowed to have short 
breaks between the blocks. Each movement was monitored online and recorded, for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with instructions, and for post-hoc screening of movement 
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parameters. The scanning procedure took approximately one hour. The procedure is shown 
in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11. Timeline of an experimental trial. After the ‘Get ready’ cue, the camera was turned on for 4000ms, 
during which the participant had to perform either a voluntary or an externally-generated movement. They were 
asked to watch a video display of their movements on a mirror-screen, and judge whether there was a delay 
between the actual movement and the visual feedback of the movement. Auditory beeps coupled to the onset 
of the visual outcome, were presented during bimodal trials. 
 
 
 
5.3 Analysis 
 
5.3.1 Behavioral Data Analysis 
 
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS21 (IBM Corp. Released 2012). 
Behavioral data were grouped based on participant’s responses regarding delay judgments, 
referred to as the subjective detection of delays. First, the proportion of ‘delay’ responses 
was calculated for each condition by dividing the number of trials in which the participant 
detected a delay between the movement and the visual feedback by the total number of 
trials. 
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5.3.2 fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
 
Functional imaging was carried out in a 3 T TIM Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany), using a 12-channel head-coil. A gradient echo EPI sequence was used (TR: 
1650ms, TE: 25ms, flip angle: 70°). The whole brain was covered in 34 axial slices (gap: 
15%, slice thickness: 4mm), each of which was acquired as a 64 x 64 matrix (FoV: 1152 x 
1152mm2, voxel size: 3 x 3 x 4.6mm) in descending order. 330 volumes were obtained 
during each experimental block. Anatomical images were obtained using a T1-weighted 
MPRAGE sequence (TR: 1900ms, TE: 2.26ms, flip angle: 9°, FoV: 256 x 256, slice 
thickness: 1mm, matrix: 256 x 256, voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1.5mm). 
In order to account for possible stimulus-correlated movement artifacts in the 
voluntary movement condition, independent components analysis (ICA) on the raw data 
was performed using the MELODIC tool (Beckmann and Smith, 2004) in FSL (Jenkinson et 
al., 2012; Smith et al., 2004). The data were prepared for the ICA with the implementation 
of slice time correction, realignment using the MCFLIRT procedure, and spatial smoothing 
with an 8mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel. After ICA, 
components related to motion artifacts were removed. The remaining preprocessing steps 
and analyses were performed using statistical parametric mapping (SPM12, Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, UK) implemented in 
MATLAB 2012b (The Mathworks Inc., 2012). Accordingly, each participant’s anatomical 
image was co-registered to their first functional images, segmented and normalized to the 
standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space, and resampled to 2 x 2 x 2 
mm3 voxels. 
Prior to statistical analyses, recorded video images from all participants were 
screened to examine whether the movements were properly and/or actually performed. 
Trials in which the participant did not move, and bimodal trials in which the movement 
detection algorithm did not work were excluded (1.4% of all trials). 
Two statistical analyses were performed: The main purpose of the first analysis was 
to identify brain areas modulated by movement and modality. Initially, common activations 
during the execution of both movements were assessed. Then, the presence of BOLD 
suppression for voluntary action outcomes and whether BOLD suppression was similar 
across different modalities were examined by contrasting externally-generated with the 
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voluntary movement condition. Possible differences in BOLD responses for voluntary 
movements that would yield differential activations in areas related to movement planning 
and execution were also examined. The second analysis was based on subjective delay 
detection, for the purpose of assessing areas differentially recruited during the perception 
of temporal discrepancies, and the influence of movement and modality on subjective 
detection of delays. 
Both analyses were performed using the general linear model (GLM). For each 
participant, a boxcar function was defined for each experimental condition, time-locked to 
the onset of the corresponding epoch, and convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). Time series of all voxels were high-pass filtered with a cut-off 
frequency of 128 seconds. Regressors of interest modelling the time during the camera was 
on were defined with regard to movement (voluntary/externally-generated) and modality 
(unimodal/bimodal). Cue and response periods were defined as block regressors. In 
addition, six realignment parameters were defined as nuisance regressors to account for 
residual motion artifacts. Individual t-maps were generated for each condition of interest 
contrasted against an implicit baseline, and passed to a second level analysis, resulting in 
four regressors of interest: voluntary unimodal (VolUni), voluntary bimodal (VolBi), externally- 
generated unimodal (ExtUni), externally-generated bimodal (ExtBi). Contrast estimates 
corresponding to the four conditions were then entered into a full factorial design. As a proof 
of principle, a conjunction of voluntary and externally-generated movements was calculated 
to identify areas commonly activated in both types of movement ((VolUni + VolBi) ∩ (ExtUni + 
ExtBi)), and across unimodal and bimodal conditions (VolUni ∩ VolBi ∩ ExtUni ∩ ExtBi). BOLD 
suppression effects were assessed by conducting a t-test for externally-generated vs. 
voluntary movement conditions using the contrast [(ExtUni + ExtBi) - (VolUni + VolBi)]. 
Moreover, common areas showing reduced BOLD responses for voluntary movements 
across unimodal and bimodal outcomes were assessed with a conjunction analysis ((ExtUni 
- VolUni) ∩ (ExtBi - VolBi)). The presence of auditory-related activity in the voluntary vs. 
externally-generated conditions were investigated in order to address predictive processing 
for auditory outcomes in the voluntary compared with the externally-generated condition 
(VolUni - ExtUni). Moreover, activity differences in the voluntary compared with externally- 
generated movements were examined using the contrast [(VolUni + VolBi) - (ExtUni + ExtBi)]. 
Differences in BOLD activity for bimodal vs. unimodal outcomes were tested by [(VolBi + 
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ExtBi) - (VolUni + ExtUni)] contrast. Because no specific hypothesis regarding the direction of 
the interaction between movement and modality, an F test was initially conducted to see 
whether there were any activations, which would presumably be followed by a t-test when 
necessary. 
Subjective delay detection-related activity with regard to movement and modality 
was assessed by dividing those trials in which a delay was detected (detected) or not 
(undetected), and using the contrast detected > undetected (referred to as ‘Det’) for each 
factor at the first level. Detected and undetected trials were contrasted at the first level for 
the purpose of simplicity in interpreting the findings. Additional analysis in which delay 
detection was also modelled at the second level revealed similar results. Therefore, results 
of the simpler model are reported here. Data from two participants were excluded due to 
insufficient number of trials (e.g. no detected trials in the unimodal condition) with regard to 
subjective delay detection responses (sample for this analysis: 18 participants; 8 females, 
age = 26.22±3.34 years). On the second level, four regressors were modelled and entered 
into a full factorial design: DetVolUni, DetVolBi, DetExtUni, DetExtBi. Two t tests were 
conducted to assess whether detection-related activity for voluntary and externally- 
generated movement differed. These were [(DetVolUni + DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni + DetExtBi)] 
for voluntary movements, and [(DetExtUni + DetExtBi) - (DetVolUni + DetVolBi)] for externally- 
generated movements. Modality effects on detection-related BOLD activity were assessed 
with the contrasts [(DetVolUni + DetExtUni) – (DetVolBi + DetExtBi)] for unimodal vs. bimodal, 
and [(DetVolBi + DetExtBi) - (DetVolUni + DetExtUni)] for bimodal vs. unimodal. Possible action- 
related interactions between movement and modality on detection-related BOLD signal 
were also examined. The respective contrasts were [(DetVolUni - DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni - 
DetExtBi)] and [(DetVolBi - DetVolUni) – (DetExtBi - DetExtUni)]. 
To correct for multiple comparisons, family-wise error (FWE) correction at p < 0.05 
implemented in SPM12 was used. In addition, to avoid type II errors, Monte Carlo 
simulations were run using the estimated smoothness of our functional data (14.6mm). This 
resulted in a minimum cluster size of 88 resampled voxels to achieve correction for multiple 
comparisons at p < 0.05, assuming an individual voxel type I error of p = 0.001 (Slotnick et 
al., 2003). The automated anatomical labelling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) 
and SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005) were used to label significant activations, 
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based on peak activation voxels. Visualization of significantly activated areas was 
performed by SPM12 and MRICron (Rorden and Brett, 2000). 
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Behavioral 
 
Figure 12a & b display proportion of delay responses as a function of movement 
and modality. A 2(Movement: Voluntary vs. Externally-generated) x 2(Modality: Unimodal 
vs. Bimodal) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of ‘delay’ 
responses. There was a main effect of movement; F(1,19) = 6.83, p < 0.05, η2 = .21. 
Accordingly, subjective delay detection was significantly higher in the external (M = .52, 
SEM= .03) than in the voluntary (M = .45, SEM = .04) condition (Figure 12c). There was no 
main effect of modality, F(1,19) = 2.24, p = .15, nor was there an interaction; F(1,19) = .08, 
p = .77. 
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Figure 12. Graphs illustrating a) proportion of delay detection for each delay as a function of movement for 
unimodal, and b) for bimodal trials, and c) significant proportion of delay detection between voluntary and 
externally-generated movements. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
In order to test whether movement duration was similar across voluntary and 
externally-generated movements, recorded trials were used to determine the approximate 
onset and offset of each movement (18 participants). A post-hoc paired-samples t-test 
showed that average movement durations across voluntary and externally-generated trials 
were not significantly different from each other; t(17) = 1.23, p = .23, d = .3; average 
movement duration for voluntary movements (M = 1373.82, SEM = 81.84), average 
movement duration for externally-generated movements (M = 1282.78, SEM = 44.22). 
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5.4.2 fMRI 
 
First, common areas implicated during voluntary and externally-generated 
movements were explored using the conjunction ([VolUni + VolBi] ∩ [ExtUni + ExtBi]). Common 
activations were found in sensory processing areas including the bilateral inferior and 
middle occipital gyri, postcentral gyri, along with inferior frontal and parietal areas, and 
bilateral thalamus and insula. The anatomical locations of these clusters are shown in Table 
I. Examination of common areas implicated across all conditions revealed similar areas (see 
Figure 13). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. fMRI results showing a) voluntary unimodal, b) voluntary bimodal, c) externally-generated unimodal, 
and d) externally-generated bimodal trials against implicit baseline. All maps were thresholded at pFWE < 0.05 
(height threshold = 4.79). 
 
 
 
BOLD suppression effects were addressed by contrasting externally-generated with 
voluntary movement trials, which revealed activations in sensory areas including the 
secondary somatosensory cortices, middle and superior temporal gyri (MTG and STG, 
respectively) extending to primary auditory cortices along with middle and superior occipital 
gyri including V5. In addition, activations were found in pre- and primary motor areas, 
inferior parietal lobules (IPL), precuneus and insula (see Figure 14a). The anatomical 
locations of these clusters are shown in Table III. 
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Figure 14. fMRI results showing a) BOLD suppression effect for voluntary compared with externally-generated 
movements, b) conjunction of unimodal and bimodal feedback for externally-generated vs. voluntary 
movements. All maps were thresholded at pFWE < 0.05 (height threshold = 4.79). 
 
 
 
Common BOLD suppression effects in sensory areas across unimodal and bimodal 
conditions were also identified, using the conjunction ((ExtUni - VolUni) ∩ (ExtBi - VolBi)). 
Significant BOLD suppression was observed in premotor areas including the SMA, bilateral 
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, middle and inferior occipital gyri as well as 
the calcarine sulci, MTG, STG, and IPL (see Figure 14b). These results suggest efference 
copy-related predictive processing for voluntary movements, based on the finding that 
activity in auditory areas was reduced during both unimodal and bimodal conditions. 
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Figure 15. a) Significant activation cluster regarding detection-related BOLD responses for self- compared with 
externally-generated movements ([(DetVolUni + DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni + DetExtBi)]) in the cerebellar vermis (p < 
0.05 cluster corrected) overlaid  on a  standardised  T1-weighted image,  with  respective bar graphs depicting 
contrast estimates (±SEM) across conditions for the respective cluster. 
 
 
 
The contrast assessing voluntary compared with externally-generated movements 
revealed no significant activations (at pFWE < .05 or p < .001 uncorrected level), suggesting 
that neither motor or sensory processing areas, nor action monitoring-related regions were 
more recruited when the movement was self-generated. 
The bimodal vs. unimodal ([VolBi + ExtBi] - [VolUni + ExtUni]) contrast revealed 
significant activations in bilateral temporal cortices, with two large clusters in bilateral STG 
(MNI: x, y, z = 62, -16, 8, T = 12.65, kE = 2166, pFWE < 0.05; MNI: x, y, z = -52, -20, 6, T = 
11,32, kE = 1688, pFWE < 0.05), and a small cluster in left inferior frontal gyrus (MNI: x, y,  z 
= -36, 14, 28, T = 4.9, kE = 2, pFWE < 0.05). No significant interactions were found for 
movement and modality. 
Second analysis regarding detection-related activations yielded two main effects, 
and an interaction. The DetVol > DetExt contrast revealed an area in the pons/cerebellar 
vermis (MNI: x, y, z = 2 -38 -42, T = 4.46, kE = 146, p < 0.05 cluster corrected) (see Figure 
15). There was also a near threshold activation in the right cerebellum IX (MNI: x, y, z = 14 
-56 -42, T = 3.94, kE = 79, p < 0.05 cluster corrected). No significant areas were found for 
the reverse contrast (DetExt > DetVol). The DetUni > DetBi contrast yielded significant 
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detection-related BOLD responses in the left cerebellum VIII (MNI: x, y, z = -24 -58 -40, T 
= 4.14, kE = 108, p < 0.05 cluster corrected), the right temporal cortex (MNI: x, y, z = 50 -24 
-12, T = 4.12, kE = 174, p < 0.05 cluster corrected), and in middle occipital gyrus (MNI: x, y, 
z = 30 -84 8, T = 4.04, kE = 138, p < 0.05 cluster corrected) (see Figure 16). The DetBi > 
DetUni contrast revealed no significant activation differences. Finally, the interaction contrast 
[(DetVolUni - DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni - DetExtBi)] yielded activation differences in the left 
cerebellum VIII (MNI: x, y, z = -26 -52 -44, T = 4.38, kE = 171, p < 0.05 cluster corrected), 
suggesting that detection-related activity for voluntary movements in this area was more 
pronounced for unimodal than for bimodal outcomes, which was similar during externally- 
generated movements (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 16. Significant activation clusters regarding detection-related BOLD responses for unimodal compared 
with bimodal trials ([(DetVolUni + DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni + DetExtBi)]) in a) left cerebellum VIII (p < 0.05 cluster 
corrected), b) right middle temporal gyrus, c) right middle occipital gyrus overlaid on a standardised T1-weighted 
image with bar graphs depicting contrast estimates (±SEM) across conditions for the respective cluster. 
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Figure 17. Activation cluster regarding detection-related interaction between movement type and modality 
([(DetVolUni - DetVolBi) – (DetExtUni - DetExtBi)]) in the left cerebellum VIII (p < 0.05 cluster corrected) overlaid on 
a standardised T1-weighted image. Bar graphs illustrate contrast estimates (±SEM) for the interaction. 
 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
In Study 3, neural correlates of perceiving unimodal vs. bimodal action outcomes 
during voluntary compared with externally-generated movements were assessed using 
realistic feedback of the hand as the visual outcome. Behaviorally, there was significantly 
higher proportion of delay responses for externally-generated compared with voluntary 
movements. fMRI findings revealed activations in several motor-related and sensory 
processing areas during both movements. As hypothesized, reduced BOLD responses 
were observed in somatosensory, auditory as well as visual processing areas for voluntary 
movements, suggesting sensory suppression on a neural level for voluntary action 
outcomes. This BOLD suppression effect was similar for unimodal and bimodal outcomes, 
indicating predictive mechanisms to be at work when the movement was voluntary. Results 
concerning detection-related BOLD responses showed significant activations during 
voluntary compared with externally-generated movements in the cerebellum, and for 
unimodal compared with bimodal trials in the right temporal and middle occipital areas along 
with the left cerebellum lobule VIII. Additionally, an interaction between movement and 
modality emerged in the left cerebellum lobule VIII, suggesting higher detection-related 
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activity in this area for voluntary movements leading to unimodal outcomes. Together, these 
new findings extend previous findings regarding BOLD suppression for voluntary action 
outcomes to a well-controlled realistic context. Moreover, results of Study 3 support the 
relevance of the cerebellum in perceiving temporal discrepancies specifically for voluntary 
movements and their outcomes. The findings also point to multisensory influences on the 
neural processing of sensory inputs associated with voluntary movements. 
Both voluntary and externally-generated movements led to activations in areas 
related to planning and control of motor tasks such as the SMA, IFG, and insula. These 
results are in line with the existing literature which suggest similar processing in premotor 
and motor structures for voluntary and externally-generated movements (Balslev et al., 
2006; Ciccarelli et al., 2005; Gerardin et al., 2000; Szameitat et al., 2012; Weiller et al., 
1996). In addition, common activations in somatosensory and auditory areas along with 
early and extrastriate visual cortices were found, indicating similar processing of sensory 
outcomes associated with both movements. When comparing externally-generated with 
voluntary movements, reduced activity was found during voluntary movements in sensory 
areas as expected. This BOLD suppression for self-generated stimuli is in line with findings 
of Study 2 (Straube et al., 2017) as well as with several other studies suggesting reduced 
activity for self-generated stimuli (Benazet et al., 2016; Blakemore et al., 1999; Blakemore 
et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2013). These findings support the idea of efference copy-based 
predictive mechanisms, leading to suppression of action outcomes only when these are 
generated intentionally. In the same contrast, cingulate cortex, MTG, precuneus and the 
putamen were implicated as well. The MTG, precuneus and the putamen are involved in 
time perception (Matell and Meck, 2004; Stevens et al., 2007), and the processing of visuo- 
motor incongruencies (Balslev et al., 2006; David et al., 2007; Dreher and Grafman, 2002; 
Leube et al., 2003a; MacDonald and Paus, 2003). Externally-generated movements also 
led to increased BOLD activity in the IPL, an area found to be relevant for visuo-motor 
monitoring, processing of incongruencies between proprioceptive and visual signals during 
passive hand movements (Balslev et al., 2006; Farrer et al., 2008; Schnell et al., 2007), 
distinction between self and other-generated actions (Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Jackson, 
2004; Leube et al., 2003b; Weiller et al., 1996), and mental imagery and complex actions 
(Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Haggard, 2009; Shergill et al., 2013; Sirigu et al., 1999). 
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Results of Study 3, therefore, provide support for the involvement of these areas in visuo- 
motor incongruencies, possibly contributing to self-other distinctions. 
As described above, BOLD suppression was observed in sensory areas, in line with 
findings of Study 2 (Straube et al., 2017). Nonetheless, findings of these two studies differ 
especially with regard to visual processing of action outcomes. In the current study, reduced 
BOLD responses were found in V5, which has been linked with visual motion processing 
(Zeki et al., 1991), whereas in Study 2, BOLD suppression effects regarding visual action 
outcomes were present only in early visual areas (Straube et al., 2017). In the current study, 
voluntary and externally-generated movements led to extended activations in primary as 
well as extrastriate visual cortices, suggesting that visual feedback of the movement 
resulted in similar processing during both movements. It could be argued that the complexity 
of the visual input in the present study might be responsible for significant differences in the 
BOLD signal only for V5, while the relatively simpler dot in Study 2 led to suppressed BOLD 
responses in early visual areas. In addition, a direct comparison of the findings is rather 
difficult, as externally-generated movements instead of passive viewing of sensory stimuli 
were used. In the present study externally-generated movements were used as baseline to 
voluntary movements, whereby movement execution and re-afferent feedback were similar 
across conditions. 
Study 3 additionally assessed whether reduced BOLD responses in auditory 
cortices was present for both outcomes. Results of the conjunction analysis suggest that 
reduced auditory cortex activity during voluntary movements was present in both unimodal 
and bimodal trials. This is similar to findings of Study 2 regarding suppressed BOLD activity 
in auditory cortices not only when there was audiovisual feedback, but also when the 
feedback was visual, and vice versa. In explaining this finding, it was proposed that the 
equal likelihood of unimodal and bimodal feedback for the voluntary movements might lead 
to the prediction and subsequent suppression of auditory processing areas in the brain 
(Straube et al., 2017). In the context of Study 3, it seems that there is supporting evidence 
for such predictive processing of auditory outcomes when the movement was voluntary. In 
other words, equal likelihood of unimodal and bimodal outcomes associated with a voluntary 
movement might have led to top-down expectation and subsequent processing for these 
outcomes (Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 1999; Wolpert, 
2007; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). Research on expectation-related processing has 
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provided convincing evidence for the reduced neural processing of expected sensory 
inputs, indicating a predictive coding mechanism in perceiving sensory information (Alink et 
al., 2010; den Ouden et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012; Kok and de Lange, 2015; Murray et al., 
2002). Results of Study 2 and 3 are in line with these findings, suggesting increased 
predictive processing of voluntary action outcomes than for externally-generated sensory 
stimuli. 
Analysis on detection-related BOLD activity revealed no significant effects for 
detected compared with undetected trials. However, there was relative involvement in a 
number of areas depending on the specific movement and modality, and an interaction 
between the two factors. First, increased BOLD activity was found in the cerebellar vermis 
for voluntary compared with externally-generated movements. The cerebellum has been 
proposed as an area where forward models are computed, and has been demonstrated to 
integrate sensory inputs from different sensory modalities as well as from efference copy 
signals (Baumann et al., 2015; Imamizu, 2010). More specifically, this area has been shown 
to play a role in modulating the sensory consequences of motor commands and providing 
error signal for the unexpected consequences of these commands (Blakemore et al., 2001; 
Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Leube et al., 2003a; Miall et al., 1993). 
This area has also been found to provide timing information for motor as well as non-motor 
processes (Baumann et al., 2015; Ivry, 1996; Ivry and Richardson, 2002). The finding of 
increased involvement in the cerebellum regarding detection-related activity in voluntary 
compared with externally-generated condition suggests that this area was specifically 
implicated in the perception of temporal discrepancies for voluntary action outcomes, and 
provides further support for the differential involvement of cerebellar areas in generating 
internal predictions about the sensory outcomes of voluntary actions (Blakemore et al., 
2001; Blakemore et al., 1999; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Wolpert et al., 1998). 
Additional findings regarding detection-related BOLD activity concern multisensory 
interactions. Accordingly, detection-related BOLD activity in unimodal trials engaged the 
right MTG and the right occipital cortex more than in bimodal trials. Research on 
multisensory processing has provided substantial evidence for enhanced behavioral 
performance (i.e., heightened perceptual awareness, decreased reaction times) coupled by 
increases in cortical activity linked to sensory processing (Driver and Spence, 2000; 
Shimojo and Shams, 2001). In addition, there is evidence that such enhancement can also 
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be observed even when a stimulus provides no information about the other sensory 
modality (Foxe et al., 2000; Giard and Peronnet, 1999; Lovelace et al., 2003; McDonald et 
al., 2000; Stein et al., 1996; Vroomen and de Gelder, 2000). On the other hand, just as a 
particular sensory modality can enhance the processing of another modality, it can also 
hinder its processing (Colavita, 1974; Laurienti et al., 2000; Macaluso et al., 2000; Sinnett 
et al., 2008). For example, Laurienti et al. (2000) found significant reductions in cortical 
activity linked to visual processing during the presentation of auditory inputs and vice versa, 
possibly as a way of increasing the salience of the relevant sensory modality that is 
presumably more important in the processing hierarchy. In both cases, spatiotemporal 
correspondences as well as semantic congruencies between different sensory inputs seem 
to drive these effects (Murray et al., 2004; Senkowski et al., 2008). When considered in light 
of these findings, increased activity in the right temporal and occipital areas indicate that 
the additional auditory modality in Study 3 inhibited, at least partly, the processing of 
temporal information. In other words, it seems that even though the auditory stimulus 
provided timing information about the visual feedback, it was not used for the behavioral 
task. Another area in the posterior cerebellum, namely the left cerebellum lobule VIII was 
also implicated more during unimodal than during bimodal trials. Moreover, the cerebellum 
lobule VIII, though with a different peak activation, has also been found to be more involved 
for voluntary movements with unimodal outcomes than with bimodal outcomes. This 
supports the assumption of inhibition regarding the presentation of auditory stimulus 
specifically when the movement was voluntary. All together, these results indicate an 
inhibitory mechanism being at work for the additional auditory modality linked with the 
voluntary movement execution, even though it carried valuable information about the timing 
of the visual feedback. In this respect, findings of Study 3 raise the possibility that auditory 
stimulus was not perceived as part of the movement, as it consisted of a beep that have 
made it difficult to be perceived as arising from the movement. Technical limitations 
preventing more complex auditory stimuli to be presented without an additional unwanted 
delay were the reason why beeps were chosen as auditory stimuli. In our future 
experiments, the aim is to include more ecologically valid auditory stimuli to investigate 
multisensory interactions during the processing of action outcomes. 
On a behavioral level, higher proportion of delay responses were found for 
externally-generated compared with voluntary movements. Decreased proportion of delay 
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detection in the voluntary movement condition suggests that these movements and their 
effects might have been perceived as closer in time, suggesting intentional binding effects 
(Haggard et al., 2002). On the other hand, despite these findings, a recent study showed 
an opposite pattern regarding the perceptual delay judgments for voluntary vs. externally- 
generated movements and their effects (van Kemenade et al., 2016). Accordingly, delay 
responses to self-generated button presses and their outcomes were significantly higher 
than when the button was pressed down automatically. These seemingly contradictory 
results might be attributed to the difference between movement-related (i.e., feedback 
occurs during movement, as in the present study) and outcome-related (i.e., feedback 
occurs at the end of movement, as in the previous study) feedback. This distinction, also 
referred to as the distinction between proximal and distal outcomes (Metcalfe et al., 2013) 
has recently attracted attention, and was investigated with regard to sense of agency (David 
et al., 2016; Metcalfe et al., 2013). Differences in behavioral responses in Study 2 and 3 
might reflect this difference in processing of movement vs. outcome-related feedback. 
Despite these novel findings, one limitation in Study 3 concerns potential differences 
in movement kinematics within and across voluntary and externally-generated movements. 
In the present study, movement range was restricted by the PMD, and participants were 
trained prior to the fMRI experiment and their movements were monitored constantly 
throughout the fMRI experiment. In addition, movement recordings taken from 18 
participants were tracked to check compliance with instructions, and no significant 
differences in the average movement duration across movements were found. 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that kinematics of voluntary movements could have 
been more variable than that of externally-generated movements, and that might have 
influenced the results. 
Although action outcome processing has been extensively investigated, studies 
using realistic sensory feedback of the action are limited. A recent study by Benazet et al. 
(2016) focused on this important factor by using visual feedback of a moving limb. In line 
with results of Study 3, they found that cortical processing of visual re-afferent signals are 
suppressed, but only when the signals are correctly predicted. Integrating real world 
situations to experimental paradigms is of crucial importance, and more studies are needed 
for investigating realistic action outcome relations. In addition, recent investigations have 
found contradictory evidence for the reduced sensation and neural processing of voluntary 
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action outcomes (Reznik et al., 2015, 2014; Roussel et al., 2013; Yon and Press, 2017). 
Therefore, more studies are needed to clarify mechanisms involved in perceiving sensory 
outcomes of voluntary movements, whether and how differential predictive processing for 
these movements exist, as well as the impact of multisensory processing on action outcome 
prediction. 
In conclusion, action-related predictive processes for voluntary movements leading 
to unimodal vs. bimodal consequences were for the first time investigated using an 
ecologically-valid set up. Externally-generated movements allowed for effectively 
distinguishing the influence of efference copy-related processes from re-afferent feedback. 
Suppressed BOLD responses were found in somatosensory, visual and auditory processing 
areas for voluntary compared with externally-generated movements, and during the 
presentation of both feedback modalities, indicating multisensory predictive mechanisms. 
Subjective detection of delays were found to be linked with increased cerebellar processing 
for voluntary movements, and additionally for voluntary movements with unimodal visual 
feedback. Unimodal visual trials were also accompanied by increased activity in areas 
associated with visuo-motor processing, indicating multisensory influences in detection- 
related BOLD activity. Together, these findings extend previous accounts regarding BOLD 
suppression to a well-controlled realistic context. Furthermore, these results support the 
relevance of cerebellum in processing error-related temporal information for voluntary 
action outcomes, and highlight the importance of investigating multisensory influences on 
action outcome processing. 
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6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.1 Summary of the main findings 
The aim of the present dissertation was to investigate behavioral and neural indices 
of perceiving multisensory action outcomes. Accordingly, distinctive processing of action 
outcomes have been examined in two domains: distortions in time perception for 
multisensory inputs triggered by voluntary movements and neural correlates of perceiving 
unimodal vs. bimodal action outcomes. 
In Study 1, perception of synchrony for multisensory stimulus pairs triggered by 
voluntary or externally-generated button presses was assessed. In addition, the influence 
of temporal contiguity between the movement and its multisensory outcome on perceived 
synchrony for these outcomes was examined. Results provided evidence for widened 
window of subjective simultaneity for AV stimulus pairs when action outcome associations 
were time-congruent. Inclusion of delays between the action and the AV outcome, 
corresponding to decreased temporal contiguity, narrowed the WSS. In other words, 
participants became more sensitive to asynchronies between auditory and visual inputs 
when these inputs occurred further away in time from the voluntary movement. However, 
the effect of delay on simultaneity perception was not proportional to the amount of delay, 
as found in Study 1.1. Accordingly, delays of 417.5 and 2500ms had a similar impact on 
SJs, suggesting that the effect might saturate after about 400ms. Similarity of SJs across 
voluntary and externally-generated movements in Study 1.2 points to a causal influences 
on time perception for multisensory stimulus pairs associated with these movements. In 
Study 1.2 simultaneity judgments were found to be similar across voluntary and externally- 
generated movements, with widened WSS around action time narrowing as delays 
increased. However, voluntary and externally-generated movements differ with regard to 
the slopes of SJ curves, with significantly steeper slopes for voluntary in comparison with 
externally-generated movements. This findings speaks for distinctive precision in judgments 
of synchrony for sensory inputs associated with voluntary movements. 
In Study 2, neural correlates of perceiving voluntary movements with unimodal vs. 
bimodal outcomes were examined. For this purpose, unimodal visual or auditory as 
opposed to bimodal AV stimuli triggered by voluntary button presses were compared with 
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similar sensory stimuli that were presented after a cue (passive viewing). Delays ranging 
from 0 to 417ms were introduced between the button press and the sensory outcome in 
order to assess how temporal discrepancies concerning the action outcome relation were 
processed in the brain, and whether modality of the outcome to be reported and whether 
there was additional sensory modality would influence error-related processing of action 
outcomes. Findings suggest BOLD suppression in visual, auditory and somatosensory 
areas of the brain when sensory stimuli were triggered by voluntary movements compared 
with when they were passively perceived. Interestingly, these areas were suppressed both 
during unimodal and bimodal trials, pointing to predictive processing of equally likely action 
outcomes. Moreover, suppression effects were observed for all modalities to be reported, 
suggesting similar perceptual processing of different sensory stimuli triggered by voluntary 
movements. Detection-related BOLD responses were found to differ depending on the 
sensory outcome, with cerebellar areas recruited for movements leading to bimodal 
outcomes, speaking for multisensory advantage for detecting sensorimotor discrepancies 
in the action outcome relation. 
In Study 3, neural correlates of perceiving multisensory action outcomes were 
investigated using realistic feedback of the hand. In addition, contrasting voluntary with 
externally-generated actions made it possible to effectively distinguish the influence of 
efference copy-related predictive processing from re-afferent feedback, and address action- 
specific processes on perceiving sensory outcomes of these actions. Participants 
performed hand movements themselves or with the use of the PMD as they saw visual 
feedback of their hand movements in real time or with delays. They were asked to detect 
delays between their actual movement and its visual outcome. Half of the trials contained 
auditory beeps coupled to the onset of the visual outcome that would presumably provide 
additional temporal information for the detection task. Results provided support for BOLD 
suppression as demonstrated by reduced BOLD responses in somatosensory, visual and 
auditory processing areas for voluntary compared with externally-generated movements. 
BOLD suppression in these areas was again similar for both unimodal and bimodal 
conditions, pointing to multisensory predictive mechanisms. Detection of delays modulated 
BOLD responses in the cerebellar vermis differentially for voluntary compared with 
externally-generated movements, supporting the involvement of this area in sensorimotor 
prediction. Moreover, activity in the cerebellar lobule VIII was higher for voluntary 
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movements with unimodal outcomes, and unimodal trials in general were associated with 
higher involvement of areas linked with visuo-motor processing (temporo-parietal areas and 
cerebellum lobule VIII), suggesting inhibition in processing the additional modality, at least 
at a neural level. 
Together, findings of the present dissertation refine our understanding of what is 
distinct about perceiving voluntary action outcomes, with the aim to reconcile the role of 
multisensory processing on action outcome perception that has so far been overlooked. In 
this respect, results of the present dissertation provide support for the predictive processing 
of voluntary actions and their outcomes, and extend it to multisensory action outcomes. 
These points are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
6.2 Multisensory influences on action outcome processing 
Despite substantial evidence on interactions among different sensory modalities, 
research on the interplay between voluntary actions and multisensory processing is scarce. 
Research on multisensory perception has provided support for behavioral enhancement 
(Arabzadeh et al., 2008; Bresciani et al., 2008; Diederich and Colonius, 2004; McDonald et 
al., 2000; Teder-Sälejärvi et al., 2005) as well as inhibition (Colavita, 1974; Meredith, 2002; 
Morein-Zamir et al., 2003; Sinnett et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2012). Moreover, several studies 
demonstrated that multisensory processing in the brain begins in early stages, contrary to 
once assumed, and in areas previously thought to be modality specific (Driver and Spence, 
2000). Importantly, temporal and spatial correspondences as well as semantic 
congruencies seem to modulate multisensory enhancement/inhibition (Calvert et al., 2000; 
Murray et al., 2004; Senkowski et al., 2007). 
Study 1 of the present dissertation provided evidence that asynchronies between 
multiple sensory inputs associated with a voluntary movement are tolerated. Concerning 
voluntary actions, recent investigations have demonstrated a tendency to perceive sensory 
modalities as simultaneous if they are thought to be associated with a voluntary movement 
(Corveleyn et al., 2015; Desantis and Haggard, 2016a, 2016b; Parsons et al., 2013). In 
addition, the assumption that the action leads to a sensory outcome aids in intentional 
binding between the action and the outcome, which in turn would contribute to the 
assumption that sensory signals from different modalities belong to the action, the so-called 
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unity assumption (Rohde et al., 2014; Vatakis and Spence, 2008, 2007; Welch and Warren, 
1980). Concerning Study 1 of the present dissertation, increased simultaneity responses 
for AV stimuli triggered by voluntary button presses presumably help maintain coherent 
perception of an event as a whole. In Study 2, behavioral detection performance was found 
to be increased for bimodal than for unimodal action outcomes, speaking for multisensory 
enhancement. On the contrary, findings of Study 3 suggest no behavioral enhancement. 
This might have arised from the fact that the auditory stimulus was not perceived as part of 
the movement, even though it provided timing information between the action and the visual 
outcome. As stated previously, it is not just temporal and spatial correspondences that 
determine multisensory enhancement or inhibition, but also the semantic congruency 
between sensory signals that modulate cross-modal interactions (Calvert et al., 2000; 
Murray et al., 2004; Senkowski et al., 2007). The brain not only combines sensory 
information, nor it always compensates for neural and physical differences in processing 
times across sensory modalities, it also attributes different sources to different sensory 
inputs (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Shams and Beierholm, 2010; Welch and Warren, 1980). 
In fact, sensory inputs originating from different sources need to be segregated (Gau and 
Noppeney, 2016). Spatiotemporal and semantic correspondences provide cues to solve the 
issue of integration/segregation (Doehrmann and Naumer, 2008; van Atteveldt et al., 2014; 
Wallace et al., 2004). Regarding the lack of behavioral effects found in Study 3, it could be 
argued that semantic correspondences might have provided the cue to discern whether 
different sensory stimuli occurring around the same time originated from a common or 
different source. Although a direct conclusion on multisensory integration/segregation 
cannot be made concerning the results of the present dissertation, it seems that overall, 
different sensory modalities presented together in Study 1 and 2 point to an increased 
tendency to integrate them to the action, whereas auditory stimulus in Study 3 suggest the 
opposite tendency to segregate it from the visual outcome of the movement. A direct 
examination of multisensory integration/segregation concerning voluntary actions provides 
valuable insights into how humans attribute common or separate causes to sensory events 
occurring around them, and infer agency over them or an outside source. Such information 
carries high survival value to the organism (Gau and Noppeney, 2016). 
As regards neural correlates of multisensory action outcome processing, results of 
Study 2 and 3 showed that equal likelihood of unimodal and bimodal outcomes associated 
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with voluntary movements lead to BOLD suppression in not only somatosensory and visual, 
but also auditory areas of the cortex. In other words, the expectation that the movement 
might lead to unimodal and bimodal outcomes resulted in suppressed BOLD responses for 
the additional modality specifically for voluntary movements. On the other hand, findings 
concerning detection-related activity in Study 2 and 3 suggest that multisensory information 
is processed differently in cases where temporal discrepancy was detected, with 
recruitment of areas of the posterior cerebellum, supporting cerebellum’s role in 
sensorimotor prediction and integration (Blakemore et al., 2001, 2000; Blakemore et al., 
1998; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Synofzik et al., 2008; Wolpert et al., 1998). In addition, 
semantic congruency of sensory stimuli seem to modulate accompanying cerebellar 
processing with regard to perceived temporal discrepancies between the movement and 
the outcome. Study 2 demonstrated increased involvement of the cerebellum for bimodal 
action outcomes, in which voluntary button presses triggered the occurrence of a dot and a 
tone. However, in Study 3, realistic visual outcome of the hand movement was 
accompanied by auditory beeps during bimodal trials. Results showed increased 
involvement of the cerebellar lobule VIII for voluntary movements with only visual outcome 
than with bimodal outcome, suggesting interference by the additional auditory modality in 
processing action-related discrepancies at a neural level. However, due to lack of 
behavioral differences in delay detection across unimodal and bimodal trials, results of 
Study 3 must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, these findings provide new 
evidence for multisensory influences in perceiving voluntary action outcomes, both on a 
neural as well as behavioral level. 
 
 
6.3 What is unique about voluntary actions? Perceptual experience and 
accompanying neural responses regarding voluntary action outcomes 
Sensory outcomes of voluntary actions have been proposed to be distinctively 
perceived compared with sensory outcomes produced externally. According to the forward 
model framework, an efference copy of the motor command informs the system about the 
predicted sensory consequences of voluntary movements (Wolpert et al., 2001; Wolpert et 
al., 1995; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). A match between the actual and the predicted 
outcome of the movement results in suppressed sensation for the outcome. A mismatch 
informs the system about changes in the environment or state estimation, which leads to 
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updating of predictions (Miall et al., 2007; Wolpert et al., 2001; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). 
Such predictive processing presumably aids in efficient detection of unexpected or salient 
inputs and sense of control over events (Blakemore et al., 2000; Moore and Obhi, 2012; 
Pynn and DeSouza, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2005). Sensory suppression and distorted time 
perception for action outcomes (i.e. intentional binding) are thought to be the results from 
forward action models (Bays et al., 2005; Haggard et al., 2002; Voss et al., 2008; Wolpert 
et al., 1995; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). In addition, suppressed responses are found to 
be correlated with decreased BOLD activity in sensory cortices, with recruitment of areas 
such as the cerebellum, angular gyrus and ACC in the case of discrepancy between the 
predicted and actual sensory outcome associated with the action (Blakemore et al., 2001, 
2000; Blakemore et al., 1999; Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Farrer et 
al., 2008; Krieghoff et al., 2011, 2009). Results of the present dissertation provide support 
for the forward model explanation. For example, Study 1.2 showed that voluntary 
movements lead to increased precision for synchrony judgments compared with externally- 
generated movements, which is in line with the assumption that predictive processing of 
voluntary action outcomes lead to distinctive sensory experience for these outcomes. Study 
2 and 3 demonstrated BOLD suppression in sensory cortices for expected outcomes of 
voluntary actions, supporting previous findings on sensory suppression at a neural and 
behavioral level (Bays et al., 2006, 2005; Benazet et al., 2016; Blakemore et al., 1999; Voss 
et al., 2008). It also extends these findings to multisensory inputs. Despite this, a number 
of studies provided contradictory evidence regarding reduced sensation and neural 
processing of self-generated action outcomes (Reznik et al., 2015, 2014; Roussel et al., 
2013; Yon and Press, 2017). Therefore, more studies are needed to clarify mechanisms 
involved in perceiving sensory outcomes of intentional movements, as well as multisensory 
influences in this process. 
Study 2 and 3 also indicated specific involvement of cerebellar structures in 
perceiving error-related information regarding voluntary actions and their outcomes. 
However, it should also be kept in mind that cerebellum is also involved in temporal 
processing (Harrington and Peck, 1998; Ivry et al., 2002; Ivry and Keele, 1989; Koch et al., 
2007). Regarding the specific role of the cerebellum in action-perception, Leube et al. 
(2003a) suggested that this area is more involved in timing perception of visual events. In 
an attempt to uncover the contribution of the cerebellum in sensorimotor vs. time 
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processing, Block and Bastian (2012) found activity in cerebellar structures with motor, but 
not sensory adaptation, pointing to particular involvement of this area for motor-related 
activity. Nevertheless, results of Block & Bastian (2012) is far from being conclusive. 
Therefore the specific involvement of this area in perceiving action outcome discrepancies 
need to be clarified in future studies. 
 
 
6.4 What might be not unique about voluntary actions? The influence of causality, 
predictability, and expectations 
While the dominant view in the study of action perception involves the assumption 
that a unique association exists for voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes, mostly 
through predictive mechanisms acquired via learning (Hughes et al., 2012; Prinz, 1997; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2010; Waszak et al., 2005; Wolpert et al., 1995), recent approaches have 
also pointed out factors other than action-specific mechanisms that influence action 
outcome processing (Buehner, 2012; Buehner and Humphreys, 2009b; Kok and de Lange, 
2015; Parsons et al., 2013; Roussel et al., 2013; Summerfield et al., 2008). These comprise 
predictability, causality and stimulus expectation. 
The first factor concerns the role of predictability. In an attempt to scrutinize action 
specific processes, Hughes et al. (2012) pointed out that temporal prediction, defined as 
the ability to predict the occurrence of a stimulus in time, might be present for externally- 
generated stimuli as well, and therefore is not specific for voluntary action outcomes. Non- 
motor identity prediction, prediction regarding the identity of the stimulus, might also be 
present in cases where no action precedes the stimulus (Hughes et al., 2012). What is 
unique about intentional actions is the fact that stimulus followed by the action can be 
precisely predicted in time through motor control mechanisms (temporal control), and also 
that the specific action effect can be predicted (motor-identity prediction). In support of this, 
auditory N1 attenuation has been shown to occur only for action effects that were congruent 
with predictions (Hughes et al., 2013). Such investigations necessitate the inclusion of 
different baseline conditions to be able to infer the contribution of temporal prediction, non- 
motor identity prediction, motor identity prediction and motor control (Hughes et al., 2012). 
In the present dissertation, baseline conditions in all studies were designed to reflect the 
real world situations where externally-generated sensory inputs cannot be predicted in time. 
95 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
This allowed for a more naturalistic representation of these stimuli. On the other hand, it 
had the disadvantage that temporal prediction might have influenced the results. Future 
studies would benefit from a more thorough examination of temporal prediction, temporal 
control, non-motor as well as motor-identity prediction on action outcome processing. 
Second issue in studying action specific processes is related to the role of causality. 
Accordingly, causal beliefs about the components of an event seem to drive our perceptual 
experience which in turn might influence action outcome perception (Buehner, 2012; 
Buehner and Humphreys, 2009b; Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; Parsons et al., 2013). 
For example, Buehner and Humphreys (2009b) demonstrated intentional binding for events 
not associated with a voluntary action. Study 1 of the present dissertation provides 
supporting evidence for the role of causality, demonstrated by the finding that asynchronies 
between different sensory modalities are tolerated around an action, no matter whether the 
action was voluntary or not. Nevertheless, the results also showed increased precision in 
judgments of simultaneity only for voluntary movements, pointing to action specific 
processing of sensory stimuli. Still, findings of Study 1 highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between factors such as causality, which might affect conclusions driven 
about action specific processes. 
Third factor that needs to be considered is the impact of expectations. It has been 
found that neural processing of expected sensory stimuli are reduced (Kok et al., 2012; Kok 
and de Lange, 2015; Murray et al., 2002). This suggests a predictive coding mechanism in 
perceiving sensory information, which might not associated with a voluntary action. In this 
respect, equal likelihood of unimodal and bimodal outcomes associated with voluntary 
actions in Study 2 might be responsible for the reduced neural responses, instead of 
sensory suppression effects. However, similar findings were present in Study 3, when the 
baseline condition would allow for a more specific inference regarding predictive processing 
of action outcomes. Still, a direct conclusion regarding expectation-related processing 
cannot be made, as the paradigm in Study 3 was not suited to test such a question. On the 
other hand, recent investigations by Reznik et al. (2015, 2014) suggest that neural and 
behavioral suppression might not as simple as a general reduction for the processing of the 
action-related sensory input, and rather depend on the expectation about stimulus intensity 
(Reznik et al., 2015, 2014). Indeed, the researchers found that auditory action outcomes 
can enhance sensory processing areas, depending on the task at hand. Other 
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investigations have supported the view that the timeline of sensory suppression might not 
as straightforward as it was previously considered (Ackerley et al., 2012; Hughes and 
Waszak, 2011; Simões-Franklin et al., 2011). Although findings of the present dissertation 
rather support the traditional view of sensory suppression, results concerning suppressed 
BOLD responses in sensory cortices, along with the results showing BOLD suppression for 
all likely outcomes might be influenced by expectation related processing. Future studies 
should look into the role of expectations on voluntary action outcome processing. 
To sum up, a number of factors other than action effect prediction has been 
demonstrated to affect how voluntary action outcomes are perceived. These involve 
predictability, causality and stimulus expectation. Effective control of these factors in 
experimental paradigms would extend our understanding of voluntary action perception, 
and of other factors important in understanding how we interact with the world around us. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this doctoral thesis, behavioral and neural indices of perceiving multisensory 
action outcomes have been investigated. The findings support distinctive processing of 
sensory inputs associated with voluntary actions, and provide new evidence concerning 
multisensory influences on how action outcome associations are processed. These findings 
are in line with the view that predictive processing of learned associations between 
voluntary actions and their sensory effects are responsible for the distinctive experience. 
However, they also emphasize the role of causality, predictability and expectations in 
modulating how action effects are perceived. 
Apart from understanding mechanisms behind sensorimotor learning and 
integration, research on action outcome perception provides invaluable information on 
agency deficits observed in patients with schizophrenia. Delusions of control commonly 
observed in patients with schizophrenia has been linked to misattribution of sensory 
outcomes produced by the self to an external source (Ford et al., 2014; Ford and Mathalon, 
2005; Frith, 2012; Pynn and DeSouza, 2013; Synofzik et al., 2010). Indeed, many positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia are thought to reflect aberrant prediction and monitoring of 
sensory inputs triggered by the self (Frith, 2012). In line with this assumption, several 
studies found that patients with schizophrenia, specifically those who experience 
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hallucinations and passivity symptoms, exhibit reduced tendency to suppress the sensory 
outcomes of their own movements (Backasch et al., 2014; Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore et 
al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005). Apart from schizophrenia, deficits in integrating sensory and 
motor signals as well as predicting the next state of the system have been implicated in 
dyslexia and autism (Blau et al., 2009; Ross et al., 2007; Stekelenburg et al., 2013). Future 
studies focusing on the psychophysiological and neural basis of these disorders would 
benefit immensely from incorporating multisensory processing and voluntary actions. 
Another implication concerns interventions aimed at improving the daily life of 
patients having difficulties in sensorimotor processing due to stroke, limb amputation or 
spinal cord injury (Collins et al., 2017; Johansson, 2012). Accordingly, the conscious 
experience of owning of one’s body parts, referred to as body ownership, has been 
proposed to depend on the integration of multiple bodily sensations such as touch, 
proprioception and vision (Botvinick, 2004; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 
2004). Although voluntary actions have been found to boost body ownership through 
predictive processing of sensory inputs (Tsakiris et al., 2010), the relation between body 
ownership and voluntary movements seems to be an intricate one, as revealed by 
heterogeneous findings (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014, 2012; Kammers et al., 2009; Tsakiris 
et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2011). Unraveling the link between one’s own bodily self and 
sense of control over events would lead the way to the development of effective intervention 
techniques, as shown by a number of investigations (Alimardani et al., 2013; Collins et al., 
2017; Ehrsson et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008). 
In sum, findings of the present dissertation extend our knowledge on action outcome 
processing to multisensory action outcomes by providing novel insights on how sensory 
modalities associated with voluntary movements are perceived and processed in the brain. 
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8 APPENDIX 
 
 
Table I. Anatomical locations of common peak activations for voluntary movements with 
unimodal and bimodal outcomes (conjunction: [(PasUniVis > VolUniVis) ∩ (PasUniAud > 
VolUniAud) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiVis) ∩ (PasUniAV > VolBiAud)]). Significance level: pFWE < 
.05, cluster with at least 5 voxels. 
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22 -60 -48 6.94 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anatomical 
Region 
Cluster Extent   Coordinates  no. Voxels 
  Hem. x y z T-value  
PCG PRG, IPL Left -36 -24 -52 13.38 1209 
 
Heschl’s gyrus, RO Left -46 -24 8 10.01 891 
 
STG, Heschl’s gyrus, RO Left -40 -30 12 9.46 
 
Occipital cortex Calcarine, LG Right 18 -98 -4 9.95 1134 
  
Right 20 -96 -4 12.43 
 
 MOG Right 28 -92 0 9.61  
 
IOG Right 36 -82 -10 7.64 
 
Occipital cortex IOG, calcarine gyrus Left -22 -94 -2 9.81 788 
STG Supramarginal gyrus, MTG Right 64 -28 10 9.55 1263 
 
Heschl’s gyrus, RO Right 52 -20 8 8.75 
 
SMA MCC Left -6 -4 54 8.98 692 
 
SMA, SFG Right 8 6 56 6.26 
 
 
SMA, SFG Right 10 2 64 5.71 
 
Cerebellum V 56%, FG Right 16 -50 -20 7.22 369 
 
VI 84%, FG Right 28 -44 -28 6.18 
 
 
VI 97%, FG Right 28 -52 -24 6.08 
 
IFG IFG pars Tri./pars oper. Right 42 8 28 7.11 236 
Cerebellum VIIIa (Hem.) 33%, VIIIb Right 
 (Hem.) 24%       
 
VIIIa (Hem.) 60% Right 30 -54 -50 4.99 
 
Insula IFG pars Tri./pars oper. Right 34 22 8 5.62 25 
Thalamus Pallidum Left -10 -18 4 5.44 89 
MCC PCC 
 
0 -40 36 5.21 22 
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Coordinates are listed in MNI space. FG: fusiform gyrus; IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; IOG: 
inferior occipital gyrus; IPL: inferior parietal lobule; LG: lingual gyrus; MCC: middle cingulate 
cortex; MOG: middle occipital gyrus; MTG: middle temporal gyrus; PCC: posterior cingulate 
cortex; PCG: postcentral gyrus; PRG: precentral gyrus; RO: rolandic operculum; SFG: 
superior frontal gyrus; SMA: supplementary motor area. 
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Table II. Processing of subjectively delayed and undelayed trials (p < .001 uncorrected, 
cluster extent: 50 voxels) 
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-28 -2 -2 5.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anatomical 
Region 
 Cluster Extent   
Coordinates 
 no. 
Voxels 
P peak 
   Hem x y z T-value  FWE 
PH HC 
 
Left 
 
-30 -34 
 
-12 
 
5.58 
 
1925 .003 
 
Putamen, pallidum, Left .017 
 insula        
 
HC, amygdala Left -22 -16 -12 4.72 
 
.083 
Precuneus 
 
Right 14 -60 22 5.53 3807 .004 
 
Precuneus Left -4 -62 18 4.79 
 
.065 
 Calcarine gyrus Left -6 -56 4 4.69  .092 
MTG ITG, TP Right 64 -6 -20 5.16 170 .017 
 
MTG, STG Right 60 -12 -16 4.61 
 
.119 
MTG STG, ITG Left -60 -8 -18 4.93 616 .039 
 
MTG, STG, ITG Left -64 -20 -8 4.54 
 
.151 
 
TP Left -46 10 -34 4.32 
 
.293 
 
Calcarine IOG, MOG Left .073 
gyrus 
 -16 -96 -6 4.76 766  
 
LG 
 
Left 
 
-24 
 
-86 
 
-14 
 
4.28 
  
.328 
FG Left -32 -80 -14 3.76 
 
.855 
MFG SFG, MFG Right 32 44 42 4.62 80 .117 
MFG, rectus 
 
0 48 -12 4.49 1005 .176 
MFG Left -4 58 -4 4.27 
 
.336 
ACC Left -4 38 -6 3.93 
 
.694 
IOG LG, FG Right 30 -90 -16 4.48 183 .184 
Calcarine gyrus, LG Right 12 -98 -6 3.68 
 
.91 
Angular gyrus MOG, IPL Right 50 -68 32 4.46 178 .20 
 
133 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Anatomical 
Region 
Cluster Extent  
Coordinates 
no. 
Voxels 
P peak 
 
  
Hem x y z T-value FWE 
 
Putamen Pallidum, amygdala Right 28 0 -6 4.42 1034 .22 
 
HC, ParaHC, FG Right 34 -30 -10 4.38 .25 
 
Putamen, insula, 
pallidum 
Right  
34 -6 -6 4.21 
.39 
STG MTG, RO Right 60 -28 8 4.37 81 .25 
 
STG, Heschl’s gyrus, 
RO 
Right  
54 -22 6 3.27 
1.00 
TP ITG Right 48 16 -32 4.29 54 .32 
 
ITG, MTG, TP Right 52 4 -36 3.22 1.00 
 
MFG Precentral gyrus, IFG Left -38 20 46 4.23 116 .37 
 
SFG Medial SFG, MFG Left -12 58 36 4.16 189 .44 
 
mSFG, SFG Left -10 66 24 3.80 .83 
 
mSFG Left -8 48 50 3.46 .99 
 
LG Cerebellum, PH Right 18 -36 -12 4.02 209 .59 
 
LG, FG, PH Right 24 -50 -8 3.80 .82 
 
Vermis, LG Right 2 -30 -10 3.19 1.00 
 
ITG FG, cerebellum Right 44 -48 -24 4.00 53 .62 
 
PCG PRG, SPL Left -28 -32 76 3.97 462 .65 
 
PCG, SPL, precuneus Left -24 -38 66 3.84 .78 
 
Paracentral gyrus, 
PCG, PRG 
Left  
-12 -30 82 3.77 
.84 
STG MTG, SMA Left -56 -32 12 3.88 71 .75 
 
MTG STG, ITG Right 48 -70 8 3.86 120 .77 
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-40 -36 16 3.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MTG 
 
 
IPL 
 
 
 
Coordinates are listed in MNI space. ACC: anterior cingulate cortex; FG: fusiform gyrus; 
IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; IPL: inferior parietal lobule; IOG: inferior occipital gyrus; ITG: 
inferior temporal gyrus; LG: lingual gyrus; MOL: medial occipital lobe; MOG: middle occipital 
gyrus; MFG: medial frontal gyrus; MTG: middle temporal gyrus; PCG: postcentral gyrus; 
PG: parahippocampal gyrus; PRG: precentral gyrus; RO: rolandic operculum; SFG: 
superior frontal gyrus; SOG: superior occipital gyrus; SPL: superior parietal lobule; STG: 
superior temporal gyrus; TP: temporal pole. 
Anatomical 
Region 
Cluster Extent   
Coordinates 
  no. 
Voxels 
P peak 
  Hem x y z T-value  FWE 
 MOG, MTG, IOG Right 40 -72 0 3.40  .99 
MTG STG, RO Left -46 -40 6 3.66 83 .92 
 
MTG, RO, Heschl’s Left .93 
 gyrus        
 
MTG, STG, ITG Left -48 -48 6 3.47 
 
.99 
MOG Angular gyrus, IPL Left -44 -74 34 3.45 68 .99 
Angular gyrus, MOG, Left 
-44 
 
-66 
 
24 
 
3.40 
.99 
Angular gyrus, MOG, Left 
-40 
 
-70 
 
40 
 
3.21 
1.00 
 
135 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Table III. Anatomical locations of common peak activations for voluntary and externally- 
generated movements (pFWE < 0.05). 
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Anatomical Region  Coordinates   
 Hem. x y z T-value no. Voxels 
Inferior occipital gyrus Left -36 -88 -8 15.5 2506 
Middle occipital gyrus Left -46 -80 0 13.2 
 
Calcarine fissure Left -14 -94 -6 12.7 
 
Middle occipital gyrus Right 36 -90 2 15.05 2845 
Calcarine fissure Right 20 -96 -4 12.43 
 
Inferior occipital gyrus Right 46 -78 -6 11.41  
Postcentral gyrus Right 48 -24 52 10.48 749 
Postcentral gyrus Right 52 -20 46 9.52 
 
Postcentral gyrus Right 32 -36 46 6.17 
 
Postcentral gyrus Left -44 -32 46 9.68 1380 
Inferior parietal lobule Left -52 -26 48 8.58 
 
Supramarginal gyrus Left -56 -22 42 8.21 
 
SMA Left 0 2 56 7.65 280 
Inferior frontal gyrus, opercular part Right 54 10 30 6.87 485 
Inferior frontal gyrus, opercular part Right 52 12 4 6.15 
 
Insula Right 40 20 2 5.67 
 
Thalamus Left -14 -18 6 6.49 115 
Thalamus Left -16 -26 -2 5.11 
 
Supramarginal gyrus Right 64 -34 24 6.32 76 
Insula Left -34 18 4 6.16 75 
Fusiform gyrus Right 38 -72 -20 6.15 1 
Rolandic operculum Left -46 -2 8 6.03 50 
Cerebellum VIII Left -20 -66 -50 5.45 78 
Rolandic operculum Right 56 -22 22 5.03 11 
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Table IV. Anatomical locations of peak activations for externally-generated vs. voluntary 
movements (Ext > Vol contrast) (pFWE < 0.05). 
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Anatomical Region  Coordinates   no. Voxels 
 Hem. x y z T-value  
Rolandic operculum Left -44 -22 32 8.68 1703 
STG Left -54 -46 16 6.44 
 
Supramarginal gyrus Left -52 -38 30 6.18 
 
Supramarginal gyrus Right 52 -32 24 6.76 766 
STG Right 48 -40 10 5.39  
SMA Left -6 6 56 6.57 1657 
SMA Right 8 2 50 6.07 
 
Middle frontal gyrus Left -24 26 44 5.86 
 
Insula Right 30 24 8 6.19 155 
Precentral gyrus Left -54 2 16 6.14 92 
Putamen Left -24 4 4 6.11 432 
Insula Left -28 22 4 5.79 
 
Putamen Left -24 16 -4 5.38 
 
Postcentral gyrus Left -22 -42 60 5.8 297 
Postcentral gyrus Left -34 -34 58 5.76 
 
Precentral gyrus Left -20 -24 68 4.98 
 
Precentral gyrus Left -36 -14 56 .578 34 
MTG Left -48 -64 22 5.56 174 
MTG Left -42 -66 8 5.33 
 
Paracentral lobule Left -6 -24 52 5.52 321 
SMA Right 8 -18 48 5.19 
 
Precuneus Right 6 -56 34 5.35 281 
Precuneus Right 6 -64 26 5.19 
 
Precuneus Right 16 -62 28 5.17 
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 Hem. x y z T-value  
Anterior cingulate cortex Right 10 22 26 5.35 51 
Putamen Right 22 10 8 5.24 21 
Paracentral lobule Right 12 -36 58 5.22 51 
Putamen Right 26 -2 10 5.18 18 
MTG Right 46 -62 8 5.17 26 
Postcentral gyrus Right 24 -40 58 5.16 34 
Middle occipital gyrus Right 40 -70 6 5.11 15 
Superior occipital gyrus Left -22 -74 30 5.09 13 
Superior frontal gyrus Left -24 -6 62 5.08 12 
Middle frontal gyrus Right 38 -4 52 5.06 4 
Superior frontal gyrus, medial Right 2 40 40 5.04 74 
Superior occipital gyrus Left -18 -66 38 5.03 21 
Precuneus Right 16 -58 48 5.02 16 
Thalamus Right 4 -26 -4 5.01 16 
Thalamus Left -4 -26 -2 4.84 
 
Middle cingulate gyrus Left -2 -42 44 4.93 8 
IPL Left -50 -58 40 4.93 5 
Middle frontal gyrus Right 28 42 14 4.92 7 
Angular gyrus Left -36 -52 34 4.91 6 
Precuneus Left -14 -58 48 4.88 4 
Angular gyrus Right 36 -56 36 4.81 1 
Cuneus Right 18 -66 36 4.81 2 
Anatomical Region Coordinates no. Voxels 
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